From threat perceptions to military postures:

Explaining trends in NATO-Europe´s military procurements between 2002-2012.

Line Sletten Larsen

Master's thesis Political Science

Department of Political Science

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

23.05.2013

From threat perceptions to military postures:

Explaining trends in NATO-Europe´s military procurements between 2002-2012.

by

Line Sletten Larsen

Master's thesis Political Science

Department of Political Science

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

23.05.2013

2013

From threat perceptions to military postures: Explaining trends in NATO-Europe´s military procurements between 2002-2012.

Line Sletten Larsen

http://www.duo.uio.no/

Trykk: Allkopi

Words: 28 982.

Summary

How to explain European military postures after the Cold War? Scholars and policy makers alike have grappled with this question. Why have European NATO members only to a limited degree allocated defense spending in the manner that hegemonic pressure and system incentives would indicate? This is a topic worthy of academic attention, not least because the conventional wisdom would be that European states have either graduated from or neglected national interest based on security policies. Alternatively the European states are free-riding on the alliance leader. These two perspectives, separately or combined, represent the dominant explanations of Europe´s relative weakness in terms of rapidly, deployable, mobile military capabilities. This thesis argues that although Europe lacks deployable equipment, it has not forgotten about its security. Rather the European allies continue to evaluate their security largely in terms of national territorial defence. By applying Steven M. Walt´s balance of threat theory, the military procurements of NATO- European allies are analyzed as a function of proximity to threat. A sample of eleven front line states is chosen in order to illustrate the predicted trends. Although more of a rhetorical than an actual hazard, many of the European allies, especially the Baltic states continue to view Russia as a threat. It is illustrated in the thesis how military procurements get more heavily focused with shorter distance to Moscow. This trend is proven to be strong, gauged using several different metrics. The only exception in this relationship between threat perception and military postures pertains small states. Small, proximate states with limited resources towards their own security actually have a more expeditionary profile than larger more remote states. This holds true even in the presence of external threat.

Acknowledgements

Starting working on the thesis in August 2012 I had no idea what the final result would look like. My initial conceptions and ideas have been revised and modified several times before finally landing at what has become my project.

I would like to thank those of you who helped me along the way: First of all I would like to thank my supervisor Asle Toje for guiding me trough the work with the thesis. For encouraging and challenging me, and for helping me when I needed advice. I could definitely not have done this without your guidance. Secondly I would like to thank Pål Bjørseth at the Norwegian Delegation to NATO in Brussels. Thank you for taking so good care of me during my two days stay in Brussels. I would also like to thank all my informants at NATO HQ who took their time to meet with me for interviews. The insights you gave me proved invaluable. Last but not least I would like to thank all the people who have supported and believed in me from the start, you proved too many to mention by name. For bringing me coffee, taking me for long walks to clear my head and for forwarding internet banalities. You know who you are.

Line Sletten Larsen, Oslo, May 2013.

Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction

How to explain European military postures after the Cold War? Scholars and policy makers alike have grappled with this question. Why have European NATO members only to a limited degree allocated defense spending in the manner that hegemonic pressure and system incentives would indicate? This is a topic worthy of academic attention, not least because the conventional wisdom would be that European states have either graduated from, or neglected, national interest-derived security politics. Alternatively the European states are free-riding on the alliance leader. These two perspectives, separately or combined, represent the dominant explanations of Europe´s relative weakness in terms of rapidly, deployable, mobile military capabilities.

In 2012 David W. Blagden and Anand Menon published an influential paper focusing on the strategic posture of individual European states. Their aim was to explore whether a realist perspective could explain the strategic behavior of modern European states. Contrary to the academic consensus they claimed that post-modern or "strategic neglect" approaches could not explain the military priorities of European states (Blagden & Menon 2012:3, 5-7). Instead the authors argued that there exists a relationship between states perceived level of vulnerability to external threat and the nature of their military posture. Military forces' primary is, in this perspective, to defend the national territory of the states.[1] While much of the debate regarding European defense spending and burden-sharing has focused on the perceived European aversion towards the use of force, Blagden and Menon claim that this is to some extent a misunderstanding. A European focus on territorial defense is mistaken for reluctance to the use of force altogether (Blagden & Menon 2012:4). The implication is thus that threat play an important role in shaping states military orientation. The more vulnerable a state perceives itself to be, the more it will focus on military capabilities needed for territorial defense. Realist theory would predict that states give primacy to the protection of the national territory, relying largely on military means to do so (Blagden & Menon 2012:8).

This thesis elaborates on the work of Blagden and Menon. Their paper invites two questions, that need to be addressed. The first is a macro-level question. This is, simply put, why an

[1] "External threat" here is understood as traditional, state-based, geographically oriented threats.

understanding of European military postures in the post-Cold War era is of importance. Why is it important to understand European military priorities? Europe is enjoying a time of peace and prosperity, with defence spending being pushed into the background. As a result many analysts have concluded that Europeans, when it comes to questions of military procurements, are being irrational or irresponsible in their priorities. If this is the case, an understanding of European military postures is of limited value. If however the opposite can be said about European military priorities, the question is an important one. This thesis tests the claim that Europeans are being far from irrational in military questions rather the Europeans are being rational actors when it comes to defence spending.

In addition to addressing these questions the thesis will aim at expanding both the theoretical and empirical positions presented by Blagden and Menon. Their article points to a valid explanation regarding European military orientations, but their research is incomplete both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. This thesis will therefore develop their research in three ways: In terms of scope, time and theoretical sophistication. One, it will aim at expanding their empirical basis further. This is primarily done by focusing on more countries than Blagden and Menon. While they include seven countries in their analysis, this thesis will include eleven.[2] The countries are only partially overlapping and chosen according to other criteria than the states in the original article. The countries put under investigation in this thesis are Norway, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary. Since the analysis includes more countries, it will however focus on fewer branches of weapons. While Blagden and Menon operates with 17 broad categories of weapons this thesis will include six.[3] Key capabilities needed both for national defence and out of area operations will be identified within land and air defence. [4]

Two, the research will broaden the time horizon, measuring tendencies over a ten year period. While Blagden and Menon evaluate the years 1990-2011, this thesis will measure the period between 2002-2012. Within this period of time the years 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2012 will be

[2] Blagden & Menon includes UK, France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Poland and Estonia (Blagden & Menon 2012:12).

[3] Blagden & Menon includes various categories in their dataset depicting metrics such as population, defence expenditure, military personnel and overall force balance. How many categories of weapons they include varies with which categories are counted. When counting 17 categories ICBMS/IRBMs, main battle tanks, other armoured vehicles, artillery, SSBNs, power projection warships, logistical, transport and training vessels, ocean going escorts, attack submarines, patrol and light attack vessels, mine warfare, combat jets, fighter planes, ground attack and recon planes, military helicopters, logistical aircraft and training are included.

[4] Sea defence is included in the original analysis. It will however not be included here due to the fact that many of the eleven states chosen have no navy.

gauged. The purpose is to uncover trends in European military postures. It is therefore deemed unnecessary to measure each year. The ten year scope of the thesis is chosen because it yields many potential advantages. This will make it possible to correct for a would-be Cold War time-lag and the revised time-frame will provide the newest, most updated numbers regarding the state´s procurements. This focus offers a peace-perspective on military priorities and state´s behavior in the absence of war. "A problem with nearly all empirical studies on balancing and alliance behavior is that they focus on major wars and ask whether states balance against or ally with the strongest or the most threatening state. They seldom examine periods of peace and ask whether the absence of war might result from the anticipation of balancing" (Levy & Thomson 2010:15-16).

Three, the thesis will develop the theoretical framework further. While the theory presented by Blagden and Menon is accurately formulated, it omits important dimensions, especially with regards to intra-alliance politics. Therefore a more precise application of Steven M. Walt's balance of threat theory and its core assumptions will be given. In addition, other contributions from the realist tradition will be introduced. This is useful in order to gain a better understanding of how states are assumed to behave, theoretically, in an alliance context. If testable hypotheses are to be derived, a more thoroughly presentation of relevant theory is needed.

1.1 The research question

The aim of this thesis is to explore trends in NATO Europe´s military procurements. A core assumption guiding this effort is that military priorities say more about states underlying security view than speech acts. It is therefore of greater value to study. Realist theory has pointed to a paradox, as argued by Blagden and Menon. Given the theory's core assumptions about every states focus on survival and military means to this end, it has become a received knowledge that Europeans don't seem to care about their own security anymore. In their seminal work Blagden and Menon highlight the fact that Europe, rather than suffering from strategic blindness, continues to evaluate their own security in terms of national territorial defense (Blagden & Menon 2012:3,4). Hence the Europeans are committed to maintaining security in Europe, their focus is simply misunderstood. It follows from this that the more exposed to an external threat a given state is the more it will focus on military capabilities wired for territorial defense.

State´s security is a product of a combination of geographical distance from a potential threat, physical barriers and the effectiveness of the military force available. These insights may shed some light on the choice of national military orientations. In accordance with balance of threat theory Blagden and Menon hypothesizes that greater vulnerability to an external threat leads states to be more concerned for territorial security.[5] Given finite resources this translates into a concern for territorial protection at the expense of out of area capabilities (Blagden & Menon 2012:8-9). However, there may come a time where states perceive themselves to be so vulnerable to a threat that internal balancing is infeasible. States in this situation are assumed to rely to a greater extent on external balancing. [6] In this case it is expected that a focus on territorial defense will be replaced by a focus on expeditionary forces. Those states most vulnerable to a perceived threat will be least motivated with pursuing goals outside their immediate region, although they will focus on some level of expeditionary forces to aid the major power, namely the United States. Those states most safe from such a threat are more likely to pursue non-local goals and hence focus on deployable forces.

"The states falling between these two poles on the other hand are more likely to focus on their national defense at the expense of expeditionary forces where this means foregoing defensive forces. This is true even when pressured by the US to develop mobile, deployable equipment" (Blagden & Menon 2012:10). Figure 1 describes the theoretical predictions.[7]

[5]The straight line in the diagram in figure 1.
[6] The divide between external and internal balancing refers to the difference between forming an alliance with other states to counter a threat (external balancing) or domestically attempts to increase national power (internal balancing) (Leyv & Thomson 2010:23; Menon & Blagden 2012:8).
[7] Figure 1 was reproduced from Blagden and Menon.

Strategic Posture and Territorial Threat

Figure 1



Although, admittedly contrarian, Blagden and Menon´s paper posits a highly relevant if controversial perspective on European military postures. In this thesis the perspective will be elaborated upon further. The research question is the following:

To what extent can threat perceptions explain the trends in NATO- Europe´s military procurements between 2002 and 2012?

By focusing on what constitutes a *threat* to the security of different states the aim is to highlight tendencies in European military capabilities. Contrary to previous analysis of burden-sharing in general and intra-European burden-sharing in particular the thesis does not argue that Europeans spend their money unwisely because they are irrational or irresponsible. Perhaps Europe rather than being stupid is sending mixed messages regarding what they prefer to spend their money on? While NATO- Europe supports the American project of transforming NATO into a global actor rhetorically, this may not have a high priority when the actual policy is to be made.

Although the thesis builds on Blagden and Menon´s hypotheses, there are blind spots in their original analysis that require further attention.

1.1.2 Assessing the blind spots

In their paper the Menon and Blagden collect data from both the EU and European NATO. Although they never state that their thesis is solely concerning NATO members, it is easy to get the impression that they are talking about the Alliance when invoking concepts such as balancing and strategic posture [8] (Blagden & Menon 2012:8). The members of the EU and NATO are to a large extent overlapping, but not completely. There are four European countries which are members of NATO but not the EU. Conversely there are six members of EU which are not NATO members. Some of these countries are neutral.[9] It seems odd to include such countries in an analysis aiming at explaining variations in military expenditure.

As mentioned in the introduction, Blagden and Menon are emphasizing their focus on seven representative countries, chosen to maximize the variation on the independent variable (Blagden & Menon 2012:11). They pinpoint how these countries look according to their theoretical claims throughout the paper. Nevertheless they confound these state-level data with the aggregate data from all the 31 countries included in the analysis when discussing their findings. In this thesis more specific hypotheses or claims will be tested. Blagden and Menon focuses, broadly speaking, on whether states are expeditionary or nationally oriented in their procurements. Instead of including all the European countries in the analysis, an additional country will be included as a control variable. The chosen country for this purpose is Spain. This approach allows for a more concise focus. If it is true that defense spending is a function of perceived threat, the selected European states in closest proximity to such a threat should be the most nationally oriented. However, the states farthest away from the threat should be more expeditionary oriented. In other words: If Spain, a country far away from the state assumed to threaten the European continent, namely Russia, is more expeditionary oriented than countries in closer proximity, the findings are strengthened.

In addition to this, it may look like Blagden and Menon have chosen the seven countries in their analysis in order to strengthen their conclusions *prima facie.* This potential problem is,

[8] Blagden and Menon state that their focus is on European strategic postures.
[9] Finland and Sweden

however, avoided in this thesis since the countries included are chosen according to their immediate proximity to Moscow, not according to any other criteria.

Another potential blind spot is the fact that Blagden and Menon exclude Romania and Spain in their analysis. [10] It seems strange to exclude the two when all the other NATO allies are included. Both Romania and Spain are however included in the present thesis, primarily due to their geographical location. Spain is in addition to its position a quite large country. This has the advantage of correcting imbalance in the survey, since there are a lot of smaller countries included.[11] Lastly they operate with quite ambiguous categories where several of the weapons categorized as wired either for national or for expeditionary purposes could in fact be used as both. To avoid the problem of indistinct categories this thesis aims at identifying capabilities with marginal utility for out of area operations when measuring territorial defense. Conversely, the capabilities used to measure expeditionary forces will have marginal utility towards defending the national territory.

1.2.1 Hypotheses

H1: European states spend overall disproportionately on territorial defence capabilities.

H1: Before being able to say anything about direction or particular relationships between the variables, the European focus when it comes to defence priorities needs to be assessed. This is a point ignored by Blagden and Menon in their analysis. The hypotheses postulate that while there are probably differing military priorities across Europe the overall trend is towards a focus on territorial defence capabilities. If this is true it should be illustrated by a tendency to prioritize certain key capabilities at the expense of others.

H2: There exists a positive relationship between proximity to threat and investment in territorial defense capabilities.

H2: Powerful states nearby pose a greater threat than those far away. The hypothesis points to the assumed relationship between geographic proximity and the perception of threat. The ability to project power declines with distance (Walt 1987:23). Hence states that have a powerful neighbor will feel more vulnerable and threatened by this neighbor than states

[10] The researchers note that this is a gap in their analysis, albeit in a footnote. No further explanation as to why these countries are excluded is given.
[11] Excluding Germany and Poland which is quite large

without such a proximate threat. As a result of this the bordering or nearby states will focus their military capacities towards securing their territory. This translates into a focus on capabilities aimed at territorial defense. States perceived as aggressive are likely to provoke a response in proximate states. As one of the largest military powers in Europe it is assumed that Russia could pose such a threat. If Russia decides to increase its military spending, other European states in general, and the old buffer states in particular, are assumed to gear up militarily (Walt 1987:25). Russian conventional forces, although partially dated and ineffectual, remain the largest in Europe and have recently embarked upon a modernization program. Besides, in terms of power potential, Russia is both fast growing and an emerging economy (Blagden & Menon 2012:11).

H3: There exists a positive relationship between the absence of external threat and the amount of GDP spent on defence. Secure states will tend to under finance their defence.

H3: States without a powerful neighbor, or who feel safe from other external aggressors will spend a smaller proportion of their GDP on military procurements. The safer the borders of a given state are perceived to be, the more military capacity can be released for other ends. Regional powers are indifferent to the global powers since they can do little to change the global balance anyways. Therefore they will ally with the superpower that is most willing to support their own objectives [12] (Walt 1987:162).

H4: Small allies will tend to balance internally within the alliance. This translates into a focus on expeditionary forces. This is true even when threatened by an external aggressor. [13]

H4: Small allies without large capabilities towards their own defense will feel especially vulnerable in the face of an external threat. This is because it is perceived as impossible or almost impossible to provide for the national security by themselves. Since it is thought that each country stands a poor chance at defending itself, the focus shifts from national defense towards expeditionary forces. This is done so as to appear more attractive in the eyes of the larger, more powerful allies. In other words: The small allies provide whole hearted support of the powerful allies to gain support themselves if ever needed. This is reflected in the states military procurements, showing a focus on expeditionary forces at the expense of national

[12] In this case the US.

[13] Methodologically it can be difficult to distinguish internal balancing against specific external threats from other sources of military buildups. With this in mind it is nevertheless assumed to be feasible to talk about internal balancing in this thesis (Levy & Thompson 2010:23; Levy & Thompson *Hegemonic threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe,* 2005)

defense. " Whether small states spend two, five or ten percent of GDP on defensive military measures only make diminutive difference in terms of security. What matters, is the alliance membership and the guarantees provided by the alliances largest members. Those with the capabilities needed to defeat or defer the external threat" (Ringsmose 2009:5).

1.2 Methodological framework

1.2.1 Methodological triangulation

Methodological triangulation refers to a research technique where the same phenomenon is being studied from different angles by combining both quantitative and qualitative methods. There are various ways in which this could be done. Fieldwork, survey research or interviews, experiments and non - reactive research are some examples. Fieldwork observes the subjects in natural settings. Surveys either interviews or administer questionnaires to samples of people. Experiments test hypotheses in controlled conditions while non-reactive research either employ various unobtrusive observational techniques or study artifacts, achieves, official statistics etc (Brewer & Hunter 1989: 14,80). Growing knowledge of the weaknesses found in single methods has led to the conclusion that social science methods should not be treated as mutually exclusive (Brewer & Hunter 1989:17).

This modus operandi has several advantages. For instance it is easier to secure a broader data basis and hence a better foundation for interpretation (Repstad 1993:20-21). It also helps eliminate bias. Because bias occurs in both qualitative and quantitative data, the use of both methods enhances the researchers confidence that the bias have been identified (Risjord, Dunbar & Moloney 2002:271). Triangulation is geared towards pinpointing the values of a phenomenon more accurately by sighting it from different methodological viewpoints. When the findings of different methods agree we are more confident about the results [14] (Brewer & Hunter 1989:17,47; Duffy 1987:131). Although it has been pointed out that multimethod research is costly (i.e. time, energy and money consuming), it is also true that various methods vary in the resources they consume [15] (Brewer & Hunter 1989:95-96). Non-intrusive research

[14] Triangulation measures the operation of assigning either a qualitative or a quantitative value to a social phenomenon (Brewer &Hunter :17).

[15] Some disadvantages with this method is time and money constraints, demands on the investigator and data analysis issues, typically concerning how to combine qualitative and quantitative data (See Duffy 1987 *Methodological triangulation: A vehicle for Merging quantitative and qualitative research methods)*

is for example more time consuming for the researcher than for the subjects at hand. Interviews on the other hand is consuming for both the researcher and the subject.

There are various ways to triangulate. Theoretical triangulation, data triangulation and methodological triangulation. The latter is most common and will also be used in this thesis. The method itself can take two forms: within method triangulation and between method. Within method triangulation is most frequently used when the phenomenon under study is multidimensional (Duffy 1987:131). The between-method or across method triangulation is more sophisticated. This is by many viewed as the archetype of triangulation strategies, bringing together data collected through more than one method to see if there is convergence in the findings (Duffy 1987:132). Between-method triangulation will be used in this thesis. A combination of semi-structured qualitative interviews and quantitative analysis will be utilized. Triangulation occurs, in other words, when one body of theory is supported both by qualitative and quantitative inquiry (Risjord et al. 2002:273).

1.2.2 Data

In this thesis a combination of qualitative semi-structured interviews, secondary sources and raw data will be combined.

1) Raw data

Raw data are data not yet subjected to processing or other kinds of manipulation. It can therefore contain errors, be of different formats or require confirmation. Nevertheless it has the advantage of letting the researcher use such data in an independent analysis and for other purposes than in the past. In this thesis the primary source of raw data will be *The Military Balance* published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Given that a period of ten years between the years 2002 and 2012 will be measured the 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2012 editions will make up the source base. It is deemed unnecessary by the author to monitor each year, since the goal is to uncover trends in the military procurements of the chosen states. In addition to this, numbers will be gathered from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. This database shows the military spending of 172 countries since 1988. It counts three formats, namely at current prices in local currencies, in US dollars at constant 2011

prices and exchange rates and as a percentage of GDP. The SIPRI data set is, however, based on open sources only (SIPRI Military Expenditure database, 2013).

Aggregate data on military spending and military manpower will be taken from the Correlates of War programme´s National Material Capabilities database. [16] This allows for a comparison of the selected European state´s military configuration at the outset.

2) Primary sources

Primary sources and raw data are closely related. Still, they are not entirely the same kind of source. A primary source is a document created during the time of study. It is an account of something experienced first-handed . The data constituting the primary source in this thesis was qualitative semi-structured interviews. They were based around a list of questions or topics to be covered during the interview-situation. The biggest advantage with this approach as compared to interviews or surveys where the answers are pre-determined is that the informants are given the opportunity to elaborate more freely on the topic at hand. The same questions were by and large asked of all the informants, and a similar wording was used. These kinds of interviews are often rich in information. They capture the context of a phenomenon and provides useful information lost in interviews where the answers are given beforehand (Bryman 2004:321).

The interviews conducted were used both as a means to gain background information about the Alliance in general, but also in order to gain country specific insights, where these could be provided. Another aim of the interviews was to extract comments on empirical facts discovered while working on the thesis. The interviews lasted between 30-60 minutes. They were carried out mainly at the NATO HQ in Brussels between the 29th and 30th of April 2013. The majority of the informants were from the Defence Policy and Planning Division (DPP).[17] Two informants were from The Defense investment Division, whereas two were from the Norwegian Delegation to NATO.[18] The last informant was Paul Cook, director at the

[16] Correlates of War: National Material Capabilities, Version 4.0 http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/NMC_v4_0.csv.

[17] The Defence Policy and Planning Division has the lead role on the defence-related aspects of NATO´s fundamental security tasks at both the political and the military level. The Planning Directorate (PD) in the Defence Policy and Planning Division is, among other things, responsible for the conduct of Alliance force planning and in assisting the defence reform efforts of nations. The Directorate works in close cooperation with national delegates and staff in national capitals. It covers a wide range of areas, including the analysis of national defence programmes. See: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/71161.htm

[18] The Defence Investment Division at NATO Headquarters provides policy, technical, financial and procedural expertise relating to armaments, air defence, airspace management and security investment. The Division´s work focuses on development of military capabilities and oversees investment in NATO assets. They ensure that

NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The interview with him was conducted over the phone on the 8th of May 2013. The views provided by the informants were to a large extent in line with each other, though different perceptions on certain phenomena also occurred.

All information provided by the informants has been pre-approved before being used in the thesis. When uncertainties regarding statements or relationships occurred the author e-mailed the informants in question to make sure there were no misunderstandings. The contributions from the interviews proved invaluable in pinpointing relationships or factors previously not thought of by the author.

3) Secondary sources

Secondary sources on the other hand are sources which interprets and analyses a primary source. In this thesis the secondary sources have been books and articles written about NATO, about European military procurements, about the history of the Alliance, about burden sharing and about force structures. Other sources such as articles in newspapers and online have also been used. The information has largely been retrieved at the library of the University of Oslo and at the Norwegian Nobel Institute.

1.2.3 The variables

The dependent variable in the thesis is military procurements in the chosen NATO-European states. It is however not feasible to measure all the weapons these states acquire. A sample will have to be made. Since the IISS lists specific units, that is the specific model of a particular tank, airplane or ship, these will be aggregated into different categories. The different branches of weapons identified will be categorized according to their primary military function. Such aggregation of data has the potential of masking qualitative differences between the weapons as well as giving a less nuanced picture of the procurements. Nevertheless it is assumed to be a good enough approach to give an indication of how the military postures of these states look.

The variable will be given six categories where three measure national defense capabilities and three measure a more expeditionary focus. To ensure that the categories do indeed

---

forces assigned to NATO are properly equipped and interoperable to undertake a full range of military missions (See: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49199.htm).

measure what they are supposed to measure it is of importance to create categories as unambiguous as possible. One way of doing this is to identify weapons with marginal utility towards national defense when measuring expeditionary forces and vice versa. The weapon-categories aimed at identifying nationally wired capabilities are thus: Heavy artillery, armoured vehicles and anti-aircraft systems. Common to these types of weapons is that they are difficult to move far away. They are therefore of limited value to out of area operations.[19] In order to gauge a state´s expeditionary capacity large transport airplanes, armoured personnel carriers and military helicopters will be identified. These weapons are characterized by greater mobility and flexibility. In addition to this they also demonstrate a higher capacity towards moving people, gear and cargo to the relevant scenery. A focus on these kinds of equipments can therefore be indicative of a more expeditionary capacity.

The independent variable is threat perception. Threat perceptions are, however, difficult to measure directly. In order to be able to say something about whether or not a state feels threatened a metric is therefore needed. In this thesis such an index is developed by focusing on the physical distance between the states and the only potential threat on the European continent, namely Moscow. Threat perception is thus measured as distance from the various state´s capitals to Moscow in kilometers. This proxy is chosen in order to evaluate the state´s perceived vulnerabilities to threat. The data used relies on Kristian Skrede Gleditsch´s "Distance between capital Cities' dataset".[20] The use of capital to capital distance is off course only one alternative approach. Under certain circumstances Russian border proximity may be more suitable to measure perceived threat. In this thesis a focus on capitals is however considered more appropriate. Capitals are after all the centers of political power and sovereignty. Many of the important decisions concerning a state´s internal and external relations are being decided here. Besides, such measurements between two points are easier to keep standardized and unambiguous.[21]

[19] It should be stressed that certain tanks, even the heavier ones, have been moved and used during operations in theaters far away such as Afghanistan. It is not impossible to move heavy equipment. The point here is simply that although it is doable it requires a focus on the capabilities which dominate the expeditionary categories.
[20] Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Distance between Capital Cities data, University of Essex. http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/capdist.csv
[21] Clearly a simple distance-as-threat-proxy treatment does not take into account physical barriers such as the Alps etc. However, as a means of approximating overall threat proximity in a way that can be generalized across Europe, it serves a useful purpose.

1.3.1 Tools of analysis

In this thesis Excel will be used to analyze the data gathered. There are many advantages with the use of Excel when analyzing data. First of all Excel is considered one of the most easily accessible spreadsheet programs. It is seldom necessary to worry about converting a spreadsheet into a different format when working with Excel, since the program is widely used and accepts most formats. Also the Excel spreadsheets can be inserted, viewed, imported or manipulated from within a variety of other popular software programs. Resources for help on how to use the program is available online, in libraries and in bookstores in the form of free tutorials (Lemoine, 2012). The program ensures both flexibility and functionality. Excel can support a spreadsheet that is up to 1 000 000 rows down and 16.000 columns wide. Once the data are plotted Excel is able to calculate large amounts of information quickly, allowing for the discovery of patterns in the data (Chaney, 2012). Also, it is fairly easy to make visually appealing graphs and charts using the program.

There are some disadvantages associated with Excel. The learning curve is said to be steep since the program contains a large number of features not necessarily intuitive for the beginners. In addition to this the program may not work on older computers. The biggest disadvantage with Excel, however, is probably its limitations when it comes to statistical analysis. "Users who need to perform complex statistical analysis should avoid Excel. There exists problems with the internal formulas and bugs have been detected in all versions of the program. This can cause the formulas to output erroneous data" (Foster, 2012). Also, the spreadsheets lack the ability to calculate simple algebraic equations. Users may experience challenges when attempting to graph a function that includes numerous algebraic variables (Evans, 2012).

Despite this excel is deemed to be a good enough tool for the purposes of this thesis. Since the aim is to uncover trends in military postures of a subset of European states, the most complex statistical metrics are not needed. Rather the advantages provided by excel´s simplicity will be taken advantage off. Other programs appropriate for analyzing data, such as SPSS, could have been used. However, the complexity provided by its many functions is not of relevance for this particular study.[22]

[22] This presentation of SPSS runs the risk of under representing the disadvantages associated with the program. First of all it does, as with Excel, require an introduction. The program is not necessarily intuitive to the

1.4 Limitations

1.4.1 The Case

The main concern of the thesis is defense spending or defence procurements in an alliance context. Even so the focus will be solely on a sub set of the European allies. As a consequence of this the role of the US in NATO will not be explored. This is partly due to the fact that the US has global interests, but also because the superpower to a greater degree is withdrawing itself from the European zone of interests.[23] (Rice 2000:49). The US is thus not made a topic for analysis. The thesis is in this sense unashamedly Eurocentric.[24]

The case under investigation is hence defence spending in Europe. Other cases could have been chosen, such as commitments to alliance endeavors. The resulting pattern would possibly be similar to the one encountered in this thesis. Nevertheless the rationale guiding the choice of focusing on military procurements is that weapons and equipment need to be bought in order to be used, both home and abroad. [25] Military capacity will thus be analyzed within broader categories of weapons. Other approaches could have been chosen, but given the rationale of the thesis this was deemed to be the most appropriate solution. When choosing this particular procedure it is important, however, to be critical towards what purchases of different kinds of weapons actually *means.* Despite it being desirable to assume that certain kinds of weapons are indicative of either territorial defence or expeditionary forces such claims cannot easily be made. It is therefore important not to assume that there exists a straight-forward relationship between weapons procured and threat perception. Nevertheless, it is a fair assumption that defence procurement is indicative of threat perceptions.

---

beginner. In addition it is crucial for the user to always remember how the data is coded. SPSS does not interpret the results, meaning it cannot say anything about what the data actually *means.* It is also important to take care of missing values at the very beginning when organizing a data set. This is because SPSS cannot identify what values are missing unless these are specified by the researcher. If left unspecified SPSS will count these values and thereby distort the results. Lastly SPSS is also quite expensive to acquire. It is also limited in that it cannot handle longitudinal panel data or some of the more advanced statistical operations (eg. multinomial logit, ordinal logit or probit logit and complementary log-log models are not readily available). For more disadvantages see: http://fmwww.bc.edu/GStat/docs/StataVSPSS.html

[23] The US perceives Europe to be fairly safe. The fact that the US is moving into Asia is a consequence of that perception

[24] The US is however mentioned throughout the thesis, but the aim is not to discover or say anything about its military procurements or what motivates them.

[25] For more on alliance endeavors see *Kosovo and the law of humanitarian intervention*, Henkin, L The American Journal of International Law.

In analyzing weapons it is also important to have in mind that the purchase of various types of equipment can be used for different kinds of military purposes simultaneously. It is not necessarily easy to separate the weapons used solely for national defense and those used for out of area operations. "In the modern world the equipment needed for Article 5 can also be used for strategic deployment. Even if your forces are defending a state within Europe they have to move in order to get there. This implies that non-article 5 and article 5 melts together" (NATO HQ, Brussels, 29th of April 2013 [Interview]).

In addition to this there is an ongoing debate about the difference between quantity and quality of equipment. This is an unending dispute regarding what is more important: To have relatively few weapons of a certain quality or to be superior due to a great number. This debate will not be discussed in this thesis. Although it is true that certain types of equipment far exceeds other this will not be discussed here. Rather it will be assumed that weapons of roughly similar capability will met, if there were ever to be a conflict. [26]

1.4.2 Causality and theory

Even though the endeavor is to explore the relationship between threat perception and military orientations the thesis does not try to say anything about causality. The only contribution brought to the table is to point out a possible link or association between the two variables. The thesis must not be considered as an entreaty in the larger debate surrounding the topic. Rather it is meant as a comment on European military procurements. In line with this ambition the thesis does not try to uncover any new data. Rather established data will be applied to existing theory. The thesis does not have any theoretical ambitions. The aim is to apply, not develop new theory. Keeping this in mind it is important to underline that the assumptions made throughout the dissertation are more true for certain NATO members than for others. The theoretical point of departure is realist theory. This is because this is where these kinds of questions are being most thoroughly studied. The thesis will hence be written within the confines of realist theory in a broader sense, with a specific focus on alliance theory as developed by Steven Walt. Alliance theory at large has the potential of providing some general insights as to how states are assumed to behave within the alliance context.

[26] For more on quantity versus quality of weapons see: Chalmers & Unterseher (1988) *Is there a tank gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets*. Also, see: Stephen J. Coonen (2006) "*The widening Military Capabilities gap between the United States and Europe: Does it matter?* and, William P. Rogerson (1990) *Quality vs quantity in military procurement.*

Since balance of threat theory is the theoretical approach chosen, some modifications of this is needed. Walt´s speak primarily about how alliances come into existence, and little about what happens next. Since the Alliance under study in this scrutiny already exists, this must be accommodated. Hence it will be assumed that states continue to balance against threat, even when in an alliance. There exists a number of theories that could have been chosen but in this thesis balance of threat, and particularly proximity to threat is the one of importance. This leads to the exclusion of other theories, also taking balancing behavior into account.

Levy and Thomson argues that there is a significant difference between sea and land powers in their threat perceptions. Blagden and Menon do not take this difference into account in their paper. [27] It will not be taken into account in this analysis either. Levy and Thomson write: "Although great-power balancing coalitions often form against states amassing high concentrations of military power in continental systems, particularly Europe, they generally do not form against states amassing high concentrations of naval power in the maritime system. Consequently the patterns of strategic interaction are fundamentally different in the two systems" [28] (Levy & Thomson 2010:8). The concentrations of power that are assumed to be the most feared and that are hypothesized to trigger balancing behavior are those that most directly and immediately threaten the territorial integrity of other states. States with large armies that can invade and occupy have traditionally been perceived as more threatening than states with large navies (Levy & Thomson 2010:14). The so-called "stopping power of water" seriously impedes even the most capable states power projection efforts. In arguing with Mearsheimer´s broader argument, it seems that insular powers are both less territorially threatened and less territorially threatening [29] (Blagden, Levy & Thompson 2011:196). Especially the first of these acknowledgements is of importance to this thesis. Whereas Blagden and Menon include the UK as one of their representative cases. This country will,

[27]Blagden and Menon points to this briefly in a footnote (p.8), but they do not elaborate further on the consequences of such a distinction. As noted by other authors, the difference between states residing at sea and those at land, can have consequences for the understanding of the behavior of these states (Levy & Thomson, 2010; Snyder 1991:23).

[28] One puzzle in this tradition is the absence of a balancing behavior against the US dominance in the system. Realists offer several explanations for this absence. Some argue that it is only a matter of time before such a coalition arises. Others argue that such a coalition will not arise because the US is a benign hegemon that does not threaten other states. Mearsheimer offers a third line of argument, arguing that no single state can acquire enough resources in the global system to dominate it, partly because of the "stopping power of water" (Levy & Thomson 2010:9,10,11; Mearsheimer, *The tragedy of Great Power Politics*).

[29]Mearsheimer argues for the stopping power of water, but also for the stopping power of land after traversing water. Sea powers can travel great distances, but they have always had difficulties in conquering land once they reach their destination (Levy & Thompson 2010:38).

however, be excluded in this elaboration of the original analysis.[30] The focus will be on the eleven front line states instead.

1.4.3 Sources

The numbers taken both from IISS and SIPRI must be used with care. These are both open-source estimates and therefore potentially inaccurate. In this thesis the numbers will nevertheless be treated as reliable when analyzing European military postures. No effort has been made to independently verify the figures presented in these publications. Numbers from the Correlates of War programme´s National Material Capabilities database will also be utilized. A potential problem with these data and those provided by the IISS is that they are not inflation adjusted. [31] Inflation is often a significant component of apparent growth in any series measured in for example dollars. By adjusting for inflation it is possible to uncover the real growth, if any. It is also possible to stabilize the variance of random or seasonal fluctuations and/or highlight cyclical patterns in the data. [32] Keeping this in mind the data from the Correlates of War programme´s National Material Capabilities are assumed to provide a sufficient basis for testing the initial hypotheses.

1.4.4 Assumptions

One of the assumptions the thesis takes for granted is that expeditionary forces are more expensive than national defense capabilities. One reason is that expeditionary forces must be interoperable with US forces, which generally are more technologically advanced than the European counterparts'. Although this is not always the case, it is nevertheless not an unfair assumption. During the interviews conducted at the NATO HQ in Brussels, many of the informants claimed that true expeditionary forces are indeed more expensive than more classical "in place" forces. This was however not necessarily a consequence of the equipment

[30] UK is one of the biggest military spenders in the world. According to the SIPRI yearbook of 2012 the UK ranks as the 4th biggest spender, only after the US, China and Russia. To focus on the UK may therefore skew the broader image. This is important because the claims that European states seldom or never contribute to expeditionary operations are rarely applied to UK (or France). It is therefore important to focus on less able states, to capture the essence of what drives trends in European Military postures. The UK is also an island separated from the continent with moats of water, rendering its motives and strategic choices of a specific art compared to other countries on the continent.

[31] Numbers from IISS are in fact inflation adjusted, but only when stated explicitly.

[32] See: Inflation adjustment available at: http://people.duke.edu/~rnau/411infla.htm

being expensive by itself, but rather at least partially, due to the fact that it could be expensive to "move to where it is needed" (NATO HQ, Brussels, 29th of April [interview]). This view was later confirmed in the interview with Paul Cook (Cook, 2013 [telephone interview]).

A second assumption of importance is that Russia continues to be a threat on the European continent.[33] This is, however, a contested claim. Arguing in a realist vein, however, this thesis claims that great powers of which states are not allied with inherently pose a potential threat for states in the proximity. Given this, the logic which dominated the Cold War has continued until today. When meeting with the informants at the NATO HQ it was a widely held belief that Russia is no longer a threat to Europe.[34] At least not in the classical sense.[35] Nevertheless, however, all the informants acknowledged that if Russia were to use armed force in the region it would be a "most dangerous scenario".[36] Article 5 is still important for many of the member states and the alliance as a whole needs to be prepared in case such a scenario should ever occur (NATO HQ, Brussels 29th of April [Interview]).

2.0 Alliances in theory

Survival is every state´s primary concern. Hence how to achieve security in a world filled with potential enemies and how to protect the nation's security interests is of utmost importance. Even though states have fought each other repeatedly throughout history it can be argued that the two world wars on the European continent once and for all highlighted the benefits of peace inducing arrangements. Thomas Hobbes argues that in the state of nature war of all against all is a natural condition because there is lacking a higher authority which can enforce order (Wolf 2006:12-13). *"[…] Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is*

[33] For more on the EU-Russia relationship see *A power Audit of EU-Russia Relations* (2007) by Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu.
[34] This is not only a belief, it is the official NATO position. Although NATO as a whole do not see Russia as a threat anymore, many individual countries continue to view it as a threat. (NATO HQ, Brussels 29th of April 2013 [Interview]).
[35] As far as Russia were considered a real threat it was more in relation to gas and energy politics.
[36] Distinguish between most dangerous and most likely scenarios. Although not likely, it would be a most dangerous scenario if Russia were to scroll across the borders (NATO HQ, Brussels, 29th of April 2013).

called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man." (Hobbes, 1651 par 13.8; emphasis added). In the international society however, no such supremacy exists and the states are left to fend for themselves. One way of achieving security in this situation is with through alliance with other states.

The mere fact that states chose to form alliances in the first place may however seem odd. Not only are alliances expensive to participate in, there are also risks associated with co-underwriting the securities of other states. Alliance formation is nevertheless one way of accumulating power and membership in an alliance constitutes the ultimate security guarantee for its members whatever their other interests may be (Snyder 1984:461-462). In a multipolar system there is an incentive to ally with some other state both to maximize benefits and to be part of the most powerful coalition (Snyder 1984:463,465). After alliances are formed however, the question becomes how firmly to commit (Snyder 1984:466).

2.1 Alliances and the realist tradition.

Modern military alliances are generally based on formal agreements that require one state to intervene militarily in support of another in the event that one is attacked (Levy & Thompson 2010:29). In this perspective NATO is an unusual alliance, in that it was formed during a time of peace (Cornish 1997:4). Traditionally the academic study of military alliances has been a predominantly realist pursuit (Cornish 1997:10). When it comes to the question of alliances and alliance behavior realist theory does indeed live up to the title "the richness of the realist tradition"(Gilpin, 1984). True of all realism is that it is founded on a pessimism regarding moral progress and the human condition. In addition it pursues a state-centric world view where the nation states are the important units of analysis (Gilpin 1984:290). Realist theories - broadly conceived - give major explanatory weight to the external environment and the relative distribution of material factors (Ringsmose 2009:3). The ordering principle of the world order is one of anarchy. This implies that there is no higher authority with power to implement rules and laws internationally. This leads to uncertainty about other states motives and intentions since every state are left to fend for themselves. The security dilemma which manifests itself in this situation cannot be avoided as long as this uncertainty prevails. The result is a logic captured in the Latin adage *Si vis pacem, para bellum,* " If you want peace prepare for war". Each state tries to accumulate more security which is met by a similar

response in other states. The nature of international affairs is thus potentially conflictual given the core assumptions of realism (Gilpin 1984:290).

Differing schools of realism have developed over time, partly to explain different behavior in the international system. Each of these theories harbor their own set of assumptions regarding alliances. Broadly conceived it is customary to talk about classical realists, neorealists and neoclassical realists. These differ in the role they assign to the system in shaping state behavior, domestic factors, institutions and the role of interpretation and bias (Toje & Kunz 2012:261).[37]

2.1.1 Military Alliances in different realist traditions

By traditional realist thinking the shift from bipolarity to multipolarity should revive the importance of alliance formation as an external means of power balancing (Goldstein 1995:69). Multipolar systems are often viewed as more unstable than bipolar ones in realist thinking. This is because they have more conflict dyads, the likelihood of power imbalances is greater and there is a higher probability of miscalculation (Snyder 2002:167; Goldstein 1995:48). With two great powers, balancing is done mainly by internal means. In a bipolar world a state has to estimate its strength only in relation to one other. In a multipolar world it is more complex because each state has to compare its strength to a number of others and also estimate the strength of actual and potential coalitions (Waltz 1993:73). Besides no types of weapons dominates the relationship. In a bipolar world nuclear weapons restore balance and simplicity.

The way in which the states organize themselves is expected to differ with a bipolar or multipolar world (Rosecrance 1966:325,327). In traditional multipolar worlds the core of an alliance consists of a small number of states of comparable size. Their contributions to each other are crucial since they are of similar size. In the bipolar order the word alliance meant something else. Here one leading superpower, the US or the USSR provided most of the security for the rest of the countries in the alliance (Waltz 2000:27). It has been argued that NATOs survival today tells us more about American power and influence in Europe than it does about institutions as entities (Waltz 2000:29).

[37] There are many versions of realism. The thesis treats the tradition as a multifaceted, bur uniform scholarly tradition.

2.1.2 Offensive and defensive realism

The field of realism now knows two kinds of structural realism, three kinds of offensive realism and several types of defensive realism (Snyder 2002:149-150). To illustrate: While Mearsheimer's offensive realism talks about how states maximize their relative power, and how this again leads to limitless power struggle, Waltz defensive realism talks about how security is the highest end. Hence the first concern is not necessarily to maximize power but to maintain the position one holds in the system (Snyder 2002:151,152,154). Sometimes states in Mearsheimer's theory are faced with having to contain a rival that seeks power at their expense. In that situation the state can chose between two strategies according to Mearsheimer: Balancing or buck-passing. Balancing means supporting a state that is challenged. Buck-passing means to hold back and take no action. The intention here is to shift the burden of resistance onto an ally or some other state (Snyder 2002:161). Buck-passing is most attractive in a balanced multipolar system with roughly equal states. It is a potential cheap strategy, as it opens up for free-riding. In addition to these two strategies a state can chose to balance or bandwagon. Balancing here means to ally with the weaker state, whereas bandwagoning means allying with the rising power (Walt 1985: 5-6). Great powers rarely bandwagon, it is the strategy for weaker states (Snyder 2002:163). Balance of power theory as stated by Waltz leads one to expect that states, if they are free to do so, will join the weaker side. It is after all the stronger, not the weaker side that poses the threat. (Waltz 1993:74).

2.1.3Waltz structural realism

Realists differ in their predictions concerning states behavioral pattern in alliances, their preferred strategies and the endurance of alliances. Given the focus on power and position, much realist thinking suggests that states will try to avoid dependence on allies (Goldstein 1995:39). However as long as anarchy endures states will continue to worry about the actual merits of alliance commitments. It is expected that states with economic, political or technological capabilities to hedge their bets and provide their own security will do so (Goldstein 1995:69). Structural realism as represented by Waltz talks about how alliances are not accidents that just happen. They are, on the contrary means to neutralize imbalances in the system (Cornish 1997:11). An alliance will endure as long as there exists a perceived

imbalance in the system. War winning coalitions therefore tend to collapse according to structural realism (Waltz 1993:75). NATO and its survival is therefore an exception in that it defeats realists expectations (Waltz 2000:23). Structural realism does also predict dissolvement in the absence of threat.

2.1.4 The origins of alliances

In his book "The origins of Alliances from 1987 Steven Walt takes these general realist assumptions one step further. His primary concern is to analyze why alliances form in the first place and what kind of behavior stems from the different alliance motives.[38] In this thesis the focus is not on why alliances come into existence in the first place. Rather it is on how states behave once they are allied. This implies that Walt's theory needs modifications in this thesis. Instead of arguing how states behave at the outset it will be assumed here that states can balance against threats even when already allied. This can take the form of internal balancing by single states.

Walt notes that power, which is the central concept in earlier realist analysis, is an important aspect in explaining alliances and alliance behavior, but that it is far from the most explanatory one [39] (Walt 1987:21). The power of other states can be either a liability or an asset depending on where it is located, what it can do and how it is used. For instance states may balance by allying with other strong states if a weaker power is more dangerous for other reasons (Walt 1985:9). In addition, states take into consideration factors that probably will affect their level of perceived threat (Walt 1987:22,263).

2.1.5 The notion of threat.

Accordingly Walt focuses on the notion of *threat* and develops an alternative theory named balance of threat theory. [40] In the international anarchy states form alliances to protect

[38]Alliances: Walt defines an alliance as a formal or informal relationship of security between two or more sovereign states (Walt 1987:1).
[39]Kenneth Waltz "balance of power theory".
[40]Threats are a product of different sources while aggregate power is only one component of threats (Walt 1985:33,35) Balance of threat theory is associated with Defensive Realism (Ringsmose 2009:2)

themselves. Their conduct is determined by the threats they perceive. [41] As mentioned, aggregate power is only one element in their calculations, albeit an important one. This is a measure of population, military capabilities, technology etc. The more of these resources states possess the greater a threat they pose to others. Secondly states take into account the geographic proximity of a potential threat in that states nearby are assumed to pose a greater threat than those far away. This is because the ability to project power declines over distance.[42] Thirdly states evaluate the offensive capabilities of others states so that large offensive capabilities are associated with a larger threat. Lastly states estimate the aggressive intentions of others so that states *viewed* as aggressive are more likely to provoke a reaction. Intention, not power is the most important here and even states with modest capabilities can therefore be seen as a great threat (Walt 1987:21-26; Cornish 1997:9). While regional powers balance against threats from other regional powers, hence proximity is important, the superpowers in the system balance against other powerful states with the largest capabilities (Walt 1987:153,158,161,164). Because of the difference between different types of states when it comes to their position in the system it is more futile to focus on how states respond to threats, rather than how they respond to shifts in the power balance (Walt 1987:179).

2.1.6 Internal and external balancing

States balance threats internally as well as externally. According to the threat-hypotheses states engaged in external balancing, partaking in an alliance, will cooperate and increase the portion of GDP spent on defence when faced with an external threat [43] (Ringsmose 2009:4). "In brief, the External Threat hypotheses proposes that states cooperate to check threats from foreign powers. Increasing threat leads to alliance cohesion because members seek to redress their eroding security predicament trough cooperation. Member states contributions to defense capability should rise with the perceptions of threat. In short, alliance members cooperate when they are scared" (Kupchan 1988:324). Most states perceived that the greatest threat to

[41] Walt assumes that there are two main responses to perceived threat in the system; balancing or bandwagoning. While balancing means to ally with other states against the threat, bandwagoning is the opposite reaction. Here the states (often weaker ones) align themselves with the source of danger (Walt 1987:17, 19,161). He also assumes that balancing is the most common response to perceived threat. It has been noted however that it is not obvious which strategy - if any, is more appropriate in the absence of threat (Cornish 1997:12).

[42] It has been noted that Walt correctly emphasizes the loss-of-strength gradient, but that he fails to recognize that a proximate threat at land is far more threatening than a proximate threat at sea (Levy & Thompson 2010:38).

[43] Defensive realists don't anticipate an asymmetrical burden-sharing within the alliance (Ringsmose 2009:4).

their security interests came from the Soviet Union and not the United states and therefore they joined the latter in a defensive balancing coalition against the USSR during the Cold War (Levy & Thompson 2010:37). Balance of threat theory postulates that states balance against the greatest threat to their interests rather than always against the most powerful state in the system.

3.0 Alliances in practice

3.1 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

In Europe the eager to create an order or higher rule to prevent states from going to war against each other can be attributed to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). [44] NATO was founded upon the idea of collective defense against an external threat, namely the Soviet Union. Since the establishment of the Alliance in 1949 and until the end of the Cold War the Soviet Union was viewed as the single most important enemy against which the West tried to balance (Lindley-French 2007:21,27). The world during the Cold War was thus characterized by bipolarity with two blocs standing against each other. In this situation NATO represented the organization of the West.

When the Alliance came into existence the US agreed to take part in NATO on an equal basis as the Western Europeans and Canadians. The Europeans were eager to get the US more involved in their affairs. As a consequence the American military assistance to Europe greatly increased after the Second World War (Lundestad 1986:268,272). In return the Europeans had to promise to increase their defense budgets considerably. The American attempt to raise the European´s own defense effort was however met only with partial success. Once the Americans were committed to NATO the incentive for the Europeans to do their part was largely gone. The US argued that if the Europeans wanted more influence in the alliance they should also be willing to bear a greater responsibility. The Europeans did not necessarily mind the American assistance, but they wanted fewer and fewer strings attached (Lundestad 1986:271-272, 275).

In 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and thereby the end of the Cold War the European security climate changed profoundly. The common interest which keeps alliances together is often a negative one, such as the fear of other states aggression. Without the Soviet

[44] Also referred to as "the Alliance"

Union the external threat suddenly disappeared and it was assumed that the Alliance would dissolve as a result (Layne 2003:5). This did not happen, but the world in which NATO finds itself today is quite different from the systemic incentives of the Cold War. With the end of bipolarity and the re-emergence of multipolarity NATO has faced a wide array of challenges. This has resulted in a reorientation of the alliances goals and strategies and NATO is now viewed by many as a "multi-purpose international security institution" (Noetzel & Schreer 2009:219). [45]

3.1.1 The burden sharing problématique

"In the past, I've worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance, between members who specialize in 'soft' humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the 'hard' combat missions ... This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today. And it is unacceptable." (Gates, 2011a)

There exists an almost unlimited base of literature on the burden-sharing problématique in the Alliance. [46] Each of these contributions are trying to explain the phenomenon by pointing at different theories and factors (Ringsmose 2009:7). Firstly it is often noted that the burden-sharing in NATO has been asymmetrical since the Alliance came into existence. The scholarly literature suggests that Americas allies seldom or never contribute to US led use of force (Ringsmose 2009: 1; Davidson 2011:4). US concerns have changed little over the years. Equity of distribution of cost among the allies and the nature of each country's contribution remains important. The US has, as a consequence, stressed that all of the allied nations have to do more (The Harmel report, 1967). In a survey regarding the burden-sharing of the Alliance approximately 78 % of Americans wanted the US allies to pay more towards their own defense (Oneal & Elrod 1989:436-437). The United States initially pressed the Europeans on a wide range of issues. The Europeans did, however, ignore the issues. They were unwilling to discuss and much less accommodate the US requests (Kupchan 1988:320). After 1990 US demanded a restructuring of allied forces towards acquiring expeditionary capabilities so as to enhance deplorability of forces outside national territory. The European

[45] It is however important to note that the strategic concept of NATO has not changed that much since the Cold War. The basic elements are still there, although they might be weighed differently today (NATO HQ, Brussels, 29th of April 2013 [Interview]).

[46] Traditional burden-sharing compared the shares of GDP devoted to defense, relative personnel and military equipment between allies (Sperling & Webber 2009:503).

NATO allies have failed to meet these goals to this day (Sperling & Webber 2009:503; Oneal & Elrod 1989:451; Rynning 2012:12).

The main conflicts in NATO have been spelled out in the Harmel report. This document points to past, future and current challenges within the Alliance. Hence, the topic of equitable burden-sharing is not a new issue, but it has been given new urgency. The US assumes that there are common interests outside the Atlantic area and the European refusal to contribute economically and militarily is often interpreted as a lack of solidarity on the part of the Europeans. "Europe on the other hand is concerned of being dragged by their American partners into conflicts outside the Atlantic area, as their concept of "wars of liberation" differs from that of the Americans. Europeans are not only very limited in the amount of force they can project beyond Europe, they must also depend heavily on the US in more nearby places like the Balkans" (O` Hanlon 1997: 5). Europe, when asked about their world role must admit that they have no common view or clear conception of a role for Europe outside the North Atlantic area. There is a growing value gap between the allies and it has been predicted that this gap will result in a transatlantic divorce. "This divorce is rooted in distinct values and differing histories and cultures. In the long run, it is feared, that these worldviews will be difficult to unite in an alliance in the future" (Rynning 2012:13).

3.1.2 European and American defense spending

In military expenditure terms the US, even when taking into account planned expenditure reductions, spends considerably more than other major powers combined (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton 1999:99). Defense spending has always been important and constituted a significant slice of American government expenditure. The defense spending as a percentage of GDP has, however, since the Cold War been downwards. As has the complement of military personnel. Despite this, the US maintains a massive conventional and nuclear military capability, well beyond that of Russia or the major middle-ranking powers pooled together (Held et.al 1999:139). In the following an account of the military developments in the US and Europe will be given. The time frame is from the early 1980s until the 2000s.

3.1.3 The 1980s

In the 1980s, world military expenditure (in constant 1987 US dollars) approached 1.000 billion per annum (Held et.al 1999:103). The Soviet Union and the US dominated arms production for much of the postwar period, and this continued into the 1980s (Held et.al 1999:117). The Warsaw Pact was signed in 1955 between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, East-Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania.[47] The Pact made the member states responsible for defending their own European territories (IISS 1980:16). During the 1980s it was estimated that the Soviet Union had conventional forces more powerful than those of NATO (Chalmers & Unterseher 1988:3,7). To illustrate, the Soviet Union had 1 840 000 men in uniform composing the army in 1984, compared to a mere 780 000 in the US (IISS 1984:5,18). In addition the Soviets had 2.1 times as many tanks in service worldwide as the NATO allies (Chalmers & Unterseher 1988:3,7). The Cold war required most NATO European military establishments to prepare to fight in place rather than to project troops or firepower at great distances (Yost 2000:99). The Warsaw Pact troops were expected to come to the European allies, if an attack were to happen. A focus on developing mobility was therefore not necessary, although the Americans were already developing weapons with greater mobility to be projected outside the US at this time. Throughout the history of the Alliance, the US has spent a higher percentage of its GDP on defense and far more in absolute terms. The difference between the Europeans and the US when it comes to military spending in absolute terms is illustrated by figure 10. [48]

[47] Albania joined the pact initially, but withdrew in 1968 (IISS 1980:16).
[48] The data was gathered from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 1988-2010, http://milexdata.sipri.org/

Figure 10 **Military Expenditure in constant (2010) US$m ., 1988-2010. NATO-Europe and USA.**



When comparing the figures for Europe with the ones from the US it becomes clear that the two parties have had a somewhat different focus from the outset. While the American army consisted of 774 00 soldiers in 1980, the number for the European allies amounted to 1 660 105 soldiers in uniform [49] (IISS 1980:5, 26-42). The US was also well underway with developing armoured personnel carriers, a figure that was close to 22 000 in 1980 [50] (IISS 1980:5).

3.1.4 The 1990s

Over the three decades 1960-1990 total world military expenditure amounted to 21.000.000.000.000 dollars, in constant 1987 levels. During much of this period NATO and the Warsaw Pact states accounted for the largest proportion of world military spending (Held et.al 1999:111). As a consequence of the "peace dividend", following the collapse of the Soviet Union, most European allies reduced their armed forces and defense budgets (Lindley-French 2002:810). One of the most significant events was nevertheless the US withdrawal of

[49] The numbers for Europe were obtained by adding all the soldiers in uniform for the allied countries. The data was taken from IISS *The Military* Balance 1980-1981 edition.
[50] M-577, M114, and M-113.

almost two-thirds of its European troops during the 1990s (Khanna & Sandler 1997:102). The reduction of the Soviet threat did not, however, result in a large scale alteration of the size and shape of the US armed services (Habarre & Frank 2003:2). The US did nevertheless decrease its military budgets from 6 % in 1989 to 3 % of GDP in 2002. The largest European allies similarly cut their budgets from 3 % of GDP to 2 % (Hallams & Schreer 2012:315). The defense gap narrowed in this period as a consequence. While this may be true, the US leadership in Iraq in 1990-1991 showed a widening gap in military capabilities within NATO. The same would later be true of the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. "It became increasingly apparent that Europe could not operate effectively without help from the US. The European deficiencies in modern war-fighting were obvious" (Hallams & Schreer 2012:316).

After 1993 NATOs force reductions were implemented. Ground forces were reduced by 25 % as compared to 1990 levels, land forces in NATOs Central Region were reduced by 45 % between 1985 - 1995. A reduction of about 16 % for the Alliance as a whole was also implemented. Of this about 13 % of the decrease was attributable to NATOs European allies (Cornish 1997:62,105).

Much of the European defense budgets during the 1990s were taken up with the costs of operating personnel-intensive conscript armies.[51] In such an environment a focus on technological advancement had been a low priority (James 2006:229). Despite the end of the Cold War several European allies adapted slowly to the new circumstances, meaning they continued focusing on Cold War force structures, training and procurement patterns, with relatively little investment in mobility or logistical support. In 1990 Jane Sharp, a British commentator declared:" [...] The European NATO countries provide 90 % of the manpower, 85 % of the tanks, 95 % of the artillery and 85 % of the combat airpower" (Yost 2000:102).

[51] It can be difficult to compare European defense budgets. This is because the definitions of what to include varies. There is a degree of harmonization in NATO although there exists certain weaknesses. First of all the budget comparisons does not include five of the EU 15 countries (not the non-allied, nor France). The comparisons are presented in local currencies without inflation and exchange rates taken into account. NATO does however distinguish four categories of defense spending namely personnel, infrastructure, equipment and "other". (Heisbourg 2000:12).

3.1.5 The 2000s

Today the US continues to be, without a doubt, the leading defence spender. Whereas the transatlantic gap used to be about how much the states spent, the debate today is more concerned with *how* the allies spend their money. The capabilities gap is still substantial between the American and European allies, but it increases when military technological capacity is taken into account. This is measured in terms of military R & D expenditure [52] (Held et. al 1999:117). As early as the 1960s it was noted that the US spent a larger proportion of its defense procurement budget on R & D than Europe. [53] Moreover, the US budget for defense R & D has increased dramatically under the Bush Administration. In 2005, the budget for defense R & D reached 75 million US$. This represents a 75 % increase and returned the US to its Cold War levels (James 2006:223-224). The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) signaled the Bush Administration´s commitment to what it called "military transformation". The QDR made it clear that "technological dominance was important in achieving the Departments transformation objectives" [54] (James 2006:227).

In Europe on the other hand, the R & D spending is highly concentrated. The six largest defence industrial countries accounted for 99 % of the defence R & D budget un EU in 2001.[55] Within this group the UK and France accounted for over 60 % of the spending alone. The differences in R & D spending has a number of causes, but most fundamental is probably the US global commitments to sustaining full spectrum dominance through technological superiority. This lies at the heart of the American doctrine (James 2006:226). In addition Europe is more cautious in its developments, meaning that the rate of adoption of new technologies is slower. "The modernization process can be said to be more evolutionary and gradual, focused on the replacement of obsolete equipment rather than the transformation of the military forces altogether" (James 2006:227). There is a general agreement that Europe lags behind the US in capabilities that are increasingly core to modern warfare, such as C4ISR, advanced sensor systems, space-based surveillance, precision, guided munitions and

[52] R&D: Research and Development
[53] The US spent one-third compared to one-quarter in Europe (James 2006:223)
[54] The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a legislatively-mandated review of Department of Defense strategy and priorities. It assesses the threat and challenges that the US faces (See: http://www.defense.gov/qdr/)
[55] France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and UK (James 2006:225)

strategic air lift (James 2006:229; Yost 2000:98). With over 600 tanker aircrafts, KC-135s and KC-10As, the US has about ten times as many aerial refueling tankers as the NATO European countries put together (Yost 2000:97). Former US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage put it like this: "If we are not able to provide our European friends with defence technologies which could fill the gap between us, we will be faced in the very near future with a nightmare scenario in NATO. The nightmare is seeing the US air force flying over the battlefield using the most sophisticated information and communications facilities available, while European allied forces are still ploughing through the fields below in their boots, with only the lowest level of technology at their disposal". [56]

In the coming decade NATO will have to operate in an environment of growing fiscal austerity and declining defense budgets. The global financial crisis has forced most European governments to cut their defense budgets. The US is however also planning significant reductions (Larrabee, Johnson, Gordon IV, Wilson, Baxter, Lai & Trenkov-Wermuth 2012:1). Nevertheless it can be noted that the military spending of 2010 was 50% higher than in 2001. This growth was almost entirely due to the US. From 2001-2010 US military spending increased by 8% as compared to 32 % in the rest of the world. To illustrate: The money spent on procurements increased from 55b $ in 2001 to 133,6 b $ in 2010 in the US [57] (Freeman, Cooper, Ismail, Sköns & Solmirano 2011:157-158). In Europe the figures are smaller with an estimated spending of 382 b $. 65,5 b $ of these were spent in Eastern Europe, while 316 b $ was spent in Western and Central Europe. The European spending was lower in real terms than in 2009, showing how the global financial crisis affects military spending (Freeman, Cooper, Ismail, Kelly, Sköns & Solmirano 2011:186).

3.2.0 Explaining European defense expenditures in the past

The imbalance in the European contributions has been attributed to a number of explanatory factors in the scholarly literature. This review does not aim to be exhaustive in listing the various explanations. It is simply meant to underline and illustrate the main perspectives often referred to when talking about European defence spending. Amongst the most important

[56] US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage´s interview, January 23rd, 2002, quoted in K. Bühler, *Funding the Future. Conference on European Defence R&D,* Brussels, January 24th 2002.
[57] The "b" refers to billion.

explanations are the ones which point to economy, free riding, post modernism and strategic abdication.

1) Economy

"European allies represented one third of total defense spending in NATO. Today it's only 20%." (Rasmussen, 2011).

Europe has been engaged in a process of disarmament under the rubric of the "peace dividend" (Lindley-French 2007:60; Lindley-French 2002:810). It has been pointed out that while it is probably true that the Europeans are cashing in on the newfound peace, economy might have something to do with the reduced defense spending as well. The research points in different directions and highlight different reasons for low defense budgets on the part of the Europeans. On the one hand there has been pointed out that Europe only can afford a limited armed force. As long as the Europeans are failing to invest enough, they cannot spare forces for participation in operations far from home.[58] (Lindley- French 2007:17; Daalder & Goldgeier 2006:106). "The cost of membership" includes financial contributions like infrastructure (Sandler & Hartley 1999:666). On the other hand the uneven distribution of burdens is explained with an increased prosperity on the continent. "As European countries have become more affluent, they have spent less on defense. Since the end of the Cold War, defense spending by the European members of NATO has declined by 20 percent. During the same period the combined gross domestic product of the European members of the Alliance has grown by 55 percent" (Larrabee et. al 2012:1-2). In this line of reasoning defense is being downgraded at the expense of domestic politics or trade. As long as there is somebody within the alliance readily capable and willing to take on the defense burden the rich countries of Europe can focus on themselves. NATO survives as long as it offers more protection at lower costs (Sandler & Hartley 1999:666). A similar vein is captured in the "free-riding" position. These are parallel but distinct arguments.

2) Free-riding

[58] The question of European participation in operations far from home may off course also be a question of political will rather than a question of money

"Europe enjoys the paradise it enjoys, in part because the United States provides the overall security that allows Europe to live in a system where military power is not a major issue" (Kagan, 2003).

In 1965 Mancur Olson published his theory of collective action. The theory has since then frequently been applied to alliances in general and NATO in particular.[59] Olson starts with the notion that it is taken for granted that groups of individuals with common interests are expected to act on behalf of their common interests. "Rational self-interested individuals will, contrary to popular belief, not act to achieve their common or group interests" (Olson 1965:1, 2). In large groups an organization will not be formed to further their common goals unless there exists coercion or separate incentives offered to the members. Hence the result is often suboptimal.[60] This is true even if there is unanimous agreement in the group about the common good and the methods for achieving it. The common good is defined as any good such that if any person X1 in a group xi….xn consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from the others in that group [61] (Olson 1965: 2, 14; Oneal 1990:380). Those who do not purchase or pay for any of the public of collective good can in other words not be excluded from the consumption of the good. "The individual member is in a position where his own efforts will not have a noticeable effect on the situation and he can enjoy any improvements brought about by others whether or not he has worked for it himself" (Olson 1965:16, 35).

A privileged group is a group that each of its members or at least some of them has an incentive to see that the collective good is provided even if he has to bear the full burden of providing it himself (Olson 1965: 50). A privileged group is typically also a smaller group. A small group has the advantage of being easier to further collective behavior than larger groups. Small group behavior helps explain the tendency for large countries to bear disproportionate shares of the burdens in multinational organizations like NATO (Olson 1965: 52, 36). In groups composed of members of different size or interest the sub optimality associated with larger groups can be avoided. The largest member, who on its own would

[59]Mancur Olson's theory presented in *The Logic of Collective* action was used to describe alliance behavior in an article by Olson and Richard Zeckhauser in 1966. This publication later informed what has been dubbed the economic theory of alliances. This must not be confused with the economy perspective given here. While economy here simply refers to the effect ofprosperity or (relative) poverty on defence expenditures, the economic theory of alliances is referring to the phenomenon of free-riding within an alliance context (Ringsmose, 2009; Oneal, 1990;Sandler& Hartley, 2001).

[60]The same logic as in game theory is being utilized by Mancur Olson. This implies a focus on utility maximation and actors acting rationally to reach the best possible outcome for themselves or their group. A sub optimal results means that it is possible to improve the situation for at least one actor without making any of the other actors worse off (Hovi 2008:34).

[61]Common good is also referred to as public or collective good (Olson 1965: 15).

provide the largest amount of the good, bears a larger share of the burden. Once the smaller members have the amount of the good he gets for free from the largest member he has more than he would have purchased for himself. Therefore there exists no incentive to obtain any of the good at his own expense. " In smaller groups with a common interest there is hence a tendency for exploitation of the *great* by the *small"* [62] (Olson 1965: 3, 35; Olson & Zeckhauser 1966: 268).

The association of sovereign states in alliances intended to deter war seems to fit these assumptions closely (Oneal 1990:380). The purpose of NATO is that it serves the common interest of its members, namely common security. The amount a nation spends on defense will be affected by how much the other allies provide. Excluding those who do not contribute is however impossible since the alliance treaty obliges a member to remain a member for the duration of the treaty (Olson &Zeckhauser 1966: 268, 273). "Although the European free riding has decreased lately it is still the norm for American allies. Moreover it is difficult for the US to make credible threats about lowering its contributions since the largest member stands to suffer the greatest loss" (Oneal& Elrod 1989: 451-452).

2) Post-modernism

"The postmodern Europe answer to threats is to extend the system of co-operative empire ever wider. "I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them", said Catherine the Great – and the European Union sometimes seems to be saying the same. This is, in fact, an exact description of the most natural security policy for a postmodern community of states. The wider the postmodern network can be extended, the less risk there will be from neighbors and the more resources to defend the community without having to become excessively militarized" (Cooper, 2003).

Europe is often seen as the region where states have transformed their national security to meet globalized challenges. Globalization requires global solutions and hence the very nature of defense is contested. "Modern capitalist societies are evolving in the direction of post military societies. The balance between welfare and warfare has shifted towards the former,

[62]The advantage rests with the smaller nations since the larger countries would lose more from withholding an alliance contribution than a small country does. The small country can expect a large addition from the large country while the larger state only can expect a relatively small addition to its defense (Olson &Zeckhauser 1966: 274).

something that is visible in the decline in military personnel and expenditure" (Held et. al 1999:137). Traditional state-centric approaches are not seen as appropriate in dealing with the new threats of the day. The rivalry between today´s great powers is no longer articulated in military terms. Rather "the implications of war among advanced industrial states are so potentially overwhelming that major war has become obsolete" (Held et.al 1999:99,101).

Internationalization and privatization of defense capabilities is one such expression of a post-national military. By privatization of military services and internationalization of force deployment, the public monopoly of force is at stake (Østerud & Matlary 2007:3-4). The threat perception of the Cold War was one-dimensional and stable, while the post Cold War threats are unpredictable and of a new kind." Ethnic turmoil, civil war and collapsed states raise questions of migration, organized crime and humanitarian crisis" (Østerud & Matlary 2007:5-6). This means an increased European focus on crisis management, humanitarian operations, organized crime and ecology (Hartley & Sandler 1999:673). Human security has thus taken on a new meaning, suggesting that " security may be viewed as emerging from the conditions of daily life - food, shelter, employment, health, public safety - rather than flowing downward from a country´s foreign relations and military strength". The individual´s security may therefore not reliably derive from their nation´s security. (Mathews 1997:51). The nature of technology and the transnational movement of people and goods have also altered the ways states pursue their security. Transnational actors can threaten a state in ways previously impossible. Financial, trade and economic connections between states has expanded the potential vulnerability of most states to crisis in distant parts of the globe (Held et.al 1999:102).

4) Strategic abdication.

"Frankly, many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can't […] the military capabilities simply aren't there."(Gates, 2011b).

There is no single “European” way of war (Venneson, Breuer, de Franco & Schroeder 2009:640). According to Robert Kagan European military policies are on the contrary the result of neglect and blindness to international threats. The continent is turning away from power to a world of rules, laws, cooperation and negotiation (Kagan 2002:1). Europe is

seeking Kant's "perpetual peace". "The US remains in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules continue to be unreliable. True security is still dependent upon military force. Europe on the other hand prefers peaceful responses to problems, such as diplomacy" [63] (Kagan 2002: 2, 12). This is due both to the fact that Europe today is comparatively weak militarily and to the historical legacy on the continent. Europe has developed a set of ideals and principles regarding the usability of power and force that differs from the American. Today it would be unrealistic to assume that Europe can return to great power status unless the states are willing to shift resources from social programs to military programs (Kagan 2002:4-5). "This decline in capabilities has come about not just because European states spend less, but also because they continue to spend badly" (Ashdown, 2011). Instead of viewing the collapse of the Soviet Union as an opportunity for showing muscles, the Europeans chose to cut defense budgets overall. Europeans no longer think about providing for their security at the level of the nation state. Rather they experience a feeling of security stemming from membership in both NATO and EU [64] (Newhouse 1997:73). The military weakness has created a Europe where strength doesn't matter. The states on the continent focus on challenges rather than threats. This has resulted in a focus on soft – power tools rather than military means. "Military power is in other words rejected as an instrument in international affairs" (Kagan 2002: 7, 10, 13, 15, 18).

In addition to the perceived "power aversion" amongst the states it has been noted that many of the countries have failed to modernize their militaries (Witney 2008:1). Most European armies are still wired for territorial defence. Today more than 70 % of European land forces are unable to operate outside national territory. Military funding is in addition channeled through separate national programs and structures creating duplication of resources. It is not a question of money. "In 2006 total defense spending within the European zone amounted to one quarter of the global defense expenditure. The problem is that the money has been spent on Cold War style militaries rather than the forces the NATO needs" (Witney 2008:1,5,10; Ashdown, 2011).

Either way it has been noted that Western European powers, both big and small, react too late with too little to crisis that seem beyond the scope of their diplomatic or military capabilities

[63] Even if this is a general trend it is difficult to generalize about Europe. To illustrate: Britons may have a more "American" view on power than many of their neighbors.

[64] Germany is interesting in this regard. When the Berlin Wall came down some *Länder* leaders wanted to convert military bases into schools or other civilian facilities. Several Mayors argued for keeping the bases because of the jobs involved. Nobody claimed, however, that the bases were necessary for defense, present or future (Newhouse 1997:73).

(Lindley-French 2002:809). The conclusion to much of this research is that Europe should aim to harmonize their effort so as to maximize effectiveness. No single European state has aggregate enough military power to bring about change in the international system. Hence NATO is vital for Europe as long as US is leading (Lindley-French 2002:810-811). The lesson from this seems to be an obvious one." While Europeans does "do" security differently to America, some Europeans does not "do" security at all" (Lindley-French 2002:789). With the threat of war gone, security is no longer focused on the need to defend national territory (Hartley & Sandler 1999:668)

4.0 Empirical survey: Threat and military spending.

4.1 Why replicating Blagden and Menon?

A replication study involves repeating a study using the same methods and data material, but with different researchers (Hani, 2009). An independent researcher should be able to replicate a study and achieve approximately the same results. A successful replication ensures that the researcher constructs a valid and reliable methodology and analysis. Reproducibility is therefore regarded as one of the foundations of the entire scientific method, a benchmark upon which the reliability of a study can be tested (Shuttleworth, 2009). Any significant results must be more than a one-off finding. It therefore has to be inherently repeatable. This will reinforce the findings and ensure that the wider scientific community will accept the hypotheses (Shuttleworth, 2008). If there is a failure to replicate so that a researchers findings could not be reproduced, serious questions about the validity could be raised. It is therefore important that the researchers spell out clearly his or her procedures so that they can be reproduced by others (Bryman 2004:77). In addition to this there are several other advantages with a replication study. First of all it can reveal flaws, inaccuracies or weaknesses in the original study, not noted by the researchers. Secondly it allows for the application of previous results to new situations, which in turn can inspire new research. A replication study also carries the potential of empirically supporting the original study, either by clarifying issues or by extending its generalizability (Hani, 2009).

4.1.1 Menon and Blagden's results reproduced

Blagden and Menon starts out with three hypotheses which they test in an original dataset (Blagden & Menon 2012:10,13)

H1: Those states most secure from conventional territorial aggression will deploy forces best adapted for out of area expeditionary deplorability.

H2: Those states so vulnerable as to have no realistic prospect of internally balancing a potential future territorial threat will also display a degree of enthusiasm for military deploy ability, and this is reflected in their capability choices.

H3: Those states falling between the poles embodied in H1 and H2 will focus on territorial defensive capability at the expense of out of area military deployability.

They take Russia to be the greatest potential threat on the European continent and postulate how the seven states they have chosen will behave given this hypothesis. France and the UK are assumed to be most secure since they are separated from Russia by water and a buffer state (Germany). Besides the two countries are viewed as particularly capable given their nuclear arsenals (Blagden & Menon 2012:12). Germany is capable, but without separation or an independent nuclear arsenal. Belgium is safe, geographically but suffers from limited recourses. Sweden is a technologically advanced but small and geographically vulnerable state. Poland is a bigger state, but vulnerable due to its proximity to Moscow. Estonia represents a very small, very vulnerable state with a small resource base and a recent history of incorporation into the Soviet Union (Blagden & Menon 2012:12-13). Figure 2 shows the predictions. [65]

[65] Figure 2 is reproduced form Blagden and Menon´s original paper.

Figure 2

Representative European States' Hypothesized Position on Vulnerability-Territoriality Curve



To test their hypotheses Blagden and Menon developed a dataset for the period 1990-2011. The data was taken from the *Military Balance* of each of the years in question.[66] In addition to data from IISS, data on military spending and manpower were taken from the Correlates of War programme´s National Material Capabilities database. Since the IISS lists specific units of weapons these were aggregated into different categories according to their military function [67] (Blagden & Menon 2012:13). European state´s vulnerability to territorial threat was measured as distance between capital cities and Moscow in kilometers. [68]

The hypotheses were investigated by creating 1990-2011 average ratios of different European state´s levels of manpower intensity and material choices. [69] To differentiate between what constitutes a focus on territorial defence and what constitutes a focus on out-of-area deployability, different weapons were taken to mean different things. Data indicating more professional personnel and long-range air and maritime mobility pointed towards greater out-of-area capabilities. Prioritizing numbers over expensive training and equipment in personnel, focusing on heavy but hard to transport armoured vehicles and maximizing coastal and local air defence, by contrast, pointed towards a relative focus on territorial defence.

[66] IISS, *The Military Balance* (1990-2011 editions) (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies)
[67] The dataset includes details of: population, military personnel numbers (regulars, reservists and conscripts), strategic nuclear forces, ground forces, air forces (combat jets, logistical aircraft, helicopters and training aircraft) and naval forces (power projection warships (aircraft carriers and ocean-going amphibious assault ships), ocean-going escorts (cruisers, destroyers and frigates), ballistic missile submarines, attack submarines (hunter-killers) and mine warfare vessels.
[68] The data were taken from Kristian Skrede Gleditsch´s "Distance between Capital Cities" dataset. University of Essex. http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/capdist.csv

[69] Blagden & Menon notes that the method of averaging across the period potentially masks important shifts from the end of the Cold War (Blagden & Menon 2012:14).

4.1.2 The analysis

Figure 3 shows the defence spending in the seven representative states between 1970 and 2007.[70] It does not speak towards the empirical validity of the hypotheses. It does however provide context. Among other things, it illustrates the differences between Europe´s larger and smaller states. France, UK and Germany spent most on defence during the period while smaller states such as Belgium, Estonia and Sweden spent the least in absolute terms.[71]

Figure 3



Figure 4 presents data from the period 1990-2007 for the seven countries. The data was calculated by dividing each of the seven states defence budgets by their number of military personnel. The proxy obtained gives an indication of how well trained, equipped and supported a state´s soldiers, sailors and airmen are. This can in turn tell us something about how advanced a state´s armed forces are. The assumption is that the higher the levels of

[70]Data was taken from Correlates of War: National Material Capabilities, Version 4.0 http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/NMC_v4_0.csv. It is worth noting that these data are not inflation adjusted and must therefore be used with caution.

[71] The data was obtained by dividing the numbers retrieved from the Correlates of War dataset by 1000. They were then plotted into the diagram.

capital intensity, the more forces are capable of challenging missions outside their home country. The graph shows the seven countries under investigation as well as the US. The United States is included for benchmarking purposes, since it is the militarily most capable state in the system. [72]

Figure 4 **Selected European State´s Military Capital Intensity, 1990-2007, US$ spent per soldier (i.e budget/personnel)**



The evidence in figure 4 supports the hypotheses. The underlying assumption guiding this diagram is that the more capital intensive a state is the more expeditionary oriented. This is confirmed by looking at the graph. The state that was assumed to be the most secure, the UK, is also the state with the most capital intensive military. France is not far behind. Conversely states that are more vulnerable, such as Poland and Germany, show much lower levels of

[72] All the figures showed in the reproduction was made by the author of this thesis. The theoretical models were copied in order to illustrate the assumptions guiding the original paper. Where differences in the data between the original analysis and the reproduction occurred the data obtained by the author of this thesis was reported. The graphs are therefore not entirely the same in the two papers..

capital intensity. [73] The figure does however lack details of specific types of capabilities. Also, it does not connect variations in military posture to variations in external threat.

Figure 5 presents data on the proportion of different European state´s population serving in their active-duty or reserve military forces. The numbers are averages over the 1990-2011 period. The proportion is plotted against the variable of threat perception, namely distance to Moscow.



Those states more directly proximate to the postulated threat source have tended to maintain a larger armed forces as a proportion of population than more distant states (Blagden & Menon 2012:17-18). This fits with the hypotheses that states more proximate to a threat will configure their armed forces for territorial defence. This is true, however, as long as internal balancing is feasible. Conversely states that perceive themselves as more secure, along with those states who perceive themselves as extremely vulnerable, will devote a smaller proportion of their national population to military. This allows for the comparatively smaller

[73] There are certain exceptions such as Sweden. Sweden have a level of capital intensity akin to that of France and the UK, even though the assumption was that this state would be more vulnerable.

forces these states generate to be better optimized for expeditionary operations. Figure 5 is however not sufficient to dismiss the possibility that other factors may be driving the observed results. The positions of France, the UK, Germany and Italy, all relatively low down the vertical axis, leaves open the possibility that size rather than threat proximity drives military choices.

Figure 6 presents data on the proportion of national militaries devoted to armoured forces. This is assessed by calculating the proportion of main battle tanks as a percentage of each country´s active military personnel. The numbers are then averaged over the 1990-2011 period. This measure is potentially problematic in that it masks the qualitative differences between different kinds of tanks. It is for example reasonable to assume that tanks procured by the West deliver a level of capability several times superior to those procured by the East.

The data does however highlight the relative importance accorded to a specific kind of weapon best adapted to continental warfare. By using a linear trend line, it can be noted that there exists a direct relationship between proximity to threat and focus on armoured forces. The polynomial line illustrates that those states that are most proximate and those states that are least proximate are less likely to focus on armoured forces. The states falling between the two extremes on the trend lines are, on the other hand, more likely to focus on or have a predominantly armoured military posture. This finding corresponds with the theoretical

Figure 6



predictions given at the outset. While states in near proximity to Moscow seems to focus on armoured forces, the states farthest apart does so only to a limited extent. This is illustrated by the positions of such countries as Estonia, Sweden, UK and France, to mention a few.

Figure 7 looks at how states prioritize two different types of military materiel, namely long-range air-lift capabilities and heavy ground warfare capabilities. The first category includes military transport aircraft and aerial tanker aircraft, both of which are required by a state wanting to project force. The second category includes main battle tanks, light tanks and armoured reconnaissance vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers[74]. The data was obtained by dividing logistical aircraft with main battle tanks and other armoured vehicles. The numbers are again given as an average of the 1990-2007 period and plotted against state´s capital distance from Moscow.



The data shows two different types of material and also helps illustrate the tradeoffs that European states make when allocating defence budgets. As the U-shaped curve shows, those states that are closest to the threat and those that are the most remote from it are most likely to prioritize air-lift capability over ground armor. Conversely those states falling between are more likely to focus on ground armor. The hypotheses that those states most secure and most vulnerable are more likely to focus on expeditionary forces is thus strengthen by figure 7.

[74] Many armoured personnel carriers (APCs) are air-portable, but not on a large scale (Blagden & Menon 2012:19)

Similarly it provides support for the assumption that states that perceive a greater territorial threat will focus on capabilities best suited to local defence. In figure 7, all of the seven states are in addition located according to the predictions.

The tradeoff between home land defence and power projection in naval forces is illustrated in figure 8. The assumption guiding these data is that states concerned with local threats will not invest in procuring the sorts of large warships best suited for long-range deployments at the expense of more numerous smaller warships better optimized for coastal defence. The numbers of ocean-going warships in each state is presented as a percentage of the total number of naval vessels.[75] The numbers are again averages for the 1990-2011 period. [76]



Among Europe´s coastal states, those that feel more territorially secure are more likely to structure their navies for long-range deployments. The opposite is true for those states who feel vulnerable. They will tend to focus on small coastal combatants, mine warfare vessels and attack submarines - weapons more suited for protection of the immediate area. [77] In

[75] The ocean-going warships category includes aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates and SSBNs (ballistic missile submarines). Warships in the non-ocean going category include patrol and light attack vessels (including corvettes, fast attack missile and torpedo boats and low intensity combatants suitable for coast guard duties) mine warfare vessels, logistical and training vessels and attack (hunter-killer) submarines (Blagden & Menon 2012:20).

[76] Data is only presented for states with a coastline

[77] In Blagden & Menon's original analysis France obtained the value of 30,51. It was therefore placed slightly behind the UK in their chart. In this analysis France is placed above the UK with a value of 33,66. This is due to an adding error in the original dataset, both when counting warships (total), power projection warships and ocean going escorts. These errors are accounted for in this reproduction of the findings. It does not, however, affect the

accordance with the hypotheses France and the UK display the greatest commitment to a global naval force structure. By contrast Belgium and Germany are much more coastally focused. [78] Poland, Sweden and Estonia - the most threatened, have close to zero ocean-going naval capabilities.

The final indicator used to test the hypotheses is the data on air power. It shows the tradeoffs between logistical airpower and combat jets, presenting the former as a percentage of the latter for each state. [79]



Both of the trend lines follow the predicted patterns. Those states that feel territorially vulnerable, but not so much that internal balancing is infeasible, are likely to privilege combat jets. Contrary, those states that are more secure, along with those that feel the most threatened are more likely to focus on transport aircraft and tankers required to initiate and sustain out of

results. Both France and the UK are still the most globally committed naval powers, although France in this dataset is slightly more so.

[78] The distinction between green water and blue water where the former describes the open water and the latter a more nearby focus.

[79] The data was calculated by dividing logistical aircraft by combat jets.

area operations. Overall the seven states chosen place themselves according to the theoretical predictions.[80]

4.2 Predictions about the eleven countries

"Weapons must be usable nationally... If a weapon is not deemed appropriate in securing national interests the state will note procure it" (NATO HQ, Brussels, 29th of April 2013, [Interview]).

In this thesis a subset of European NATO allies was chosen for further analysis. The main assumption guiding this endeavor was that threat perceptions were a function of geography in general and geographic proximity in particular. [81] Given this, and in accordance with the hypotheses postulated earlier, the eleven countries were expected to behave in the following manner:



Note: The map was retrieved from Google maps

Spain, although not the state with the greatest distance to Moscow per se, was assumed to be the most secure of all the states in the sample.[82] Spain was chosen as the control country in this thesis for two reasons. First of all it is a fairly large and capable state, a so called middle-

[80] ** States with one or more logistical aircraft and no combat aircraft coded at 100 percent. States with one or more combat aircrafts and no logistical aircrafts coded as 0 percent

[81] "Security is at least partially geographically determined". (Cook, 8.5.2013 [Phone interview]).

[82] Portugal is even farther away. Nevertheless it was more appropriate to use Spain as a benchmark for the purposes of this analysis.

ranking power, and secondly it was excluded from the original analysis by Blagden and categories to a greater extent than the other countries. It´s military postures would, in other words, be more indicative of an expeditionary focus. This does not mean that the state would focus exclusively on procuring equipment more suitable for out of area operations. Rather it meant that if the states Menon.[83] Data on the country was therefore needed in order to make valid assumptions about its military procurements.

It was assumed that Spain would prioritize capabilities within the three expeditionary evaluate their security in relation to proximity to threat, remote states should give a comparatively greater weight to these kinds of capabilities at the expense of traditional in place forces. [84] Following this line of reasoning, it was assumed that all the eleven states in the sample would have a tendency to focus more heavily on weapons wired for territorial defence. This is due to their immediate proximity to Moscow. The shorter the distance between Moscow and the capital city in question, the greater focus on heavy material. This is true of all states unless they are very small and consequently even more vulnerable. To quote one of the informants at the NATO HQ: "The threat of Russia is a credibility question except for small states" (NATO, HQ, Brussels 30th of April 2013 [Interview]).

"The small state is distinguished from the Great and medium Powers because of capability factors such as population, natural resources, level of economic development [...] and military strength" (Barston 1971:49). [85] In this thesis the very small and proximate states were Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. [86] They were therefore thought to be more expeditionary in their focus, compared to their larger neighbors. Other smaller states like Norway, Denmark and Slovakia

[83] Spain aims at maintaining a "full spectrum force" within both land, sea and air defence capabilities. This is despite the recent recession. For more on Spain's military structure see: *NATO and the Challenges of Austerity.* The RAND cooperation, 2012.

[84] In other words: Spain is assumed to focus less on heavy material, and more on lighter, transport and mobile equipment.

[85] In the chapter where the definition of a small state was taken from, the author operated with a population of up to 10-15 million people (See: Barston 1971:41). This is however of little value here. Most of the states in the sample except from Germany, Poland and Romania have between 1,2 million and 7 million inhabitants, rendering the majority of them "small". Given this the population-limit will be set at 3,5- 4 million people. This threshold excludes the two Nordic states from the small state category. It is however not an arbitrary choice. It would be grossly misleading to include the Nordic countries in this category just because they have small populations. There are, after all, many significant differences between the Baltic states and the Nordic states. These are not purely economic although the Nordic region enjoys both a higher level of economic development and natural resources. In addition to being at least somewhat more populous they are also considered to be stronger militarily.

[86] The Baltic states have small GDPs. Latvia has a GDP of 28 252 million dollars, Estonia has a GDP of 22 155 million dollars whereas Lithuania has a GDP of 42 725 million dollars (See: The World Bank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf

were assumed to demonstrate a somewhat greater expeditionary capacity due to their size, although not to the same extent as the three Baltic States.

The state with the greatest distance to Moscow after Spain is Bulgaria. It is surrounded by allies and Romania in particular works as a buffer-state. After Bulgaria comes Norway. Norway is a wealthy but fairly small country, something which may affect the levels of perceived vulnerability.[87] Germany is the country after Norway in distance from Moscow. Germany is a big country with large aggregate resources. Nevertheless it was expected to focus its hardware on more heavy and hard to move material. Slovakia, Denmark and Hungary are the next countries on the distance to Moscow spectrum. They were assumed to have much of the same focus as the other states. They are however surrounded by countries which are both farther away and closer to Moscow at the same time, something which may have influenced their priorities. Romania and Poland are the most proximate to Moscow, when not counting the Baltic states. These two countries were consequently assumed to be very heavily focused in their procurements. The three very small and very vulnerable Baltic States were however assumed to be more expeditionary in their profile, despite being the most proximate to threat. In sum, all the states were assumed to be territorially oriented, and this trend was assumed to increase with increased proximity. Nevertheless, Bulgaria with its greatest distance, would be considered relatively more secure than Poland. Although still vulnerable compared to Spain.

4.2.1 Representativeness of the sample

The states chosen for analysis may not be representative for Europe as a whole.[88] Many of them are small and a majority of the sampled states are Eastern European or old Warsaw Pact members. Nevertheless the sample was not necessarily intended to be representative for the entire continent. Rather it was chosen to illustrate a trend stemming from proximity to threat. The states could in other words not have been chosen according to any other criteria than their geographical distance to Moscow. The countries are nevertheless not the issue per se in the thesis. They are merely used as examples to illustrate an assumed tendency. The more examples showing the same inclination, the better. The control variable is meant to further

[87] Norway is however in an unique position within the Alliance. It is the only country which does not boarder to another allied state. Instead it shares borders with Russia (NATO, HQ, Brussels, 30th of April [Interview]). This may affect the levels of threat Norway perceives, which may again affect the military procurements.
[88] That being said, one can ask whether it is possible or even feasible to talk about representative states given Europe´s diversity.

strengthen the hypotheses. If Spain is indeed more expeditionary than the rest of the states in the test the findings have more credibility and are in effect strengthened.

4.2.2 Coding

The data was taken from IISS *The Military Balance* 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2012 editions. [89] An approach of strict coding was also applied. This meant that only capabilities which truly served the purpose the categories tried to explain were included. [90] The dependent variable was coded in the following manner: [91]

1) Armoured Vehicles: The category consisted of the total number of main battle tanks and IFVs for a given country in a given year. [92] The data were aggregated to yield one number describing the countries total armoured vehicles.

2) Heavy Artillery: The category was primarily coded as all artillery over 155 mm. In some cases where the states lacked material meeting the 155 mm threshold, however, smaller artillery were also included in this category. 152 mm was the lowest limit for inclusion. No artillery smaller than this was included in the category.

3) Anti-aircraft systems: Included in the category was all heavy or large equipment yielded for the purpose of air defence. [93] This implied surface to air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery and

[89] IISS lists the total equipment of the countries featured as of November in the year prior to publication, rather than just the new equipment they have acquired (Henry Boyd, Research associate for Defense and military analysis, IISS, 14.05 2013 [e-mail]. The newest data in this thesis is therefore from November 2012.
[90] In the original analysis provided by Blagden & Menon several of the categories are too inclusive regarding what weapon models to include. For instance: The category they label logistical aircraft is supposed to illustrate a state´s ability to perform strategic lift and transportation of cargo, personnel and equipment over great distances. Given this the category should include larger airplanes more capable for this task. For several of the states, in particular the Baltic's, this is not the case. These states do not possess large airplanes of the kind the category is trying to depict. Nevertheless the states are coded as having "logistical airplanes" throughout the period in question. Estonia for instance does only possess 2 light An-2 *Colts*, for each year between 1990-2011. This plane hardly qualifies as a large logistical airplane. When Estonia later is treated as having expeditionary capacities due to its logistical aircrafts, this is clearly a misrepresentation of the state´s true procurements and abilities. In this thesis the problem is avoided in that only equipment that can truly be said to serve a certain function is included.
[91] For a more detailed record of the coding see Appendix 2.
[92] IFV or AIFV as it is listed in the Military Balance stands for Armoured Infantry fighting vehicle. IFVs were aggregated together with main battle tanks due to their supporting role. Although not as heavily armed they often operates alongside main battle tanks and provide fire support. They are more heavily armed than APCs. An IFV is expected to gain 30 % or more weight from armor additions throughout its lifespan. This makes it more heavy and also more like the main battle tanks in its configuration.
(See:http://www.militaryfactory.com/armor/infantry-fighting-vehicles.asp)
[93] Air defence and anti-aircraft systems are used interchangeably

multi rocket launchers. Weaponry organized in batteries was also included. This was due to the fact that batteries are heavier and more difficult to move. Larger guns which are not hand held were also included. All hand held guns, missiles or manpads were however excluded from the category.

4) APC: All armoured personnel carriers in the inventories were included in the category. No distinction was made between tracked and wheeled armoured personnel carriers.[94] Protected Patrol Vehicles were also included in this category where relevant. [95]

5) Large transport planes: Primarily larger transport planes able to perform strategic air lifts were included. This implies being able to lift heavy cargo, equipment and personnel. Larger planes filling a supporting role, such as aerial refuelling tankers were also included where relevant. Smaller transport planes for domestic use were excluded. Light planes only capable of transporting a limited number of people or material were also excluded.

6) Military helicopters: In this category both transport helicopters and supporting helicopters were included. While support helicopters transport supplies and equipment to forward operating bases, transport helicopters are used to transport personnel, troops, and cargo in support of military operations and training. They are often referred to as utility or cargo helicopters. The cargo carried by the helicopters is carried either internally or externally. Helicopters without the ability to carry personnel or material were excluded. Smaller helicopters with shorter range were also excluded. [96] (Roayal Air Force, 2013).

4.3 The analysis

Figure 11 depicts the eleven states military expenditure from 1970-2007. The data was obtained by dividing the raw data by 1000 for each of the years in question. The graph cannot

[94] There exists a certain difference between tracked and wheeled armoured personnel carriers. The ones that are wheeled can often travel greater distances on their own without being transported by flat-bed trucks or railway. Tracked APCs need to have their treads serviced or replaced on a regular basis. Tracks can however not be punctured, something which makes it more difficult to immobilize. In addition they often have greater road mobility, greater obstacle climbing and maneuverability than wheels. Wheels are often limited to roads or less difficult terrain (See: http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product1424.html

[95] Menon and Blagden coded APCs as a type of capability more typical of national defenses'. In this thesis it is argued that APCs primary role is to move personnel from one place to another. It is not designed to participate in direct combat since they are purely armed for self-defence. It would therefore be erroneous to group them together with such equipments as main battle tanks. These are after all designed primarily for participating in direct combat.

[96] Some medium sized helicopters were included in this category.

say anything about military procurements and proximity to threat. It can however provide a configuration of the state´s military postures at the outset. As illustrated by the figure, larger countries, such as Germany and Poland, tend to spend more money in absolute numbers on defence relative to smaller states. While Germany increased its defence spending during the depicted period, the rest of the states in the sample continued to spend relatively little. Despite the data not being inflation adjusted, it nevertheless gives support to the common perception that European state´s commitment to defence spending has dwindled after the Cold War. However, after a short downfall in the 1990s following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the spending increased again.

Figure 11

Selected European State´s Military Expenditure, 1970-2007, current-year U.S $ million



* No Estonia data available prior to 1992. ** Germany data is for the Federal Republic (West Germany) until 1989, and for unified Germany form then onwards. Data from Correlates of War: National Material Capabilities, Version 4.0. Data accessed january 8th 2013 at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/NMC_v4_0.csv

Figure 12 presents data on states military capital intensity from 1990-2007. The numbers were calculated by dividing the eleven states defence budgets by their number of military personnel. The resulting data obtained is an indication of how well trained and equipped the states military personnel are. In general it is assumed that higher levels of capital intensity provide an indication as to how advanced a state´s armed forces are. According to figure 12, the three Western European states in the sample, namely Germany, Norway and Denmark are also the states with the most capital intensive militaries. Norway more so than the two others at the end of the period. This supports the idea that wealthier countries spend more on defence than poorer ones. It cannot, however, say anything about what kinds of equipment the states

prioritize, nor about any relationship between procurements and threat perception. It is also perfectly possible to score high on the index without this being a sign of efficiency. It is possible to use defence funds without delivering any improvements in capability, if spending is wasteful.



In order to gain information about the relationship between the variables a more fine grained analysis is needed. But before investigating this some information about the state's overall focus or tendencies is needed.

Figure 13 shows the aggregate numbers of territorial defence capabilities and expeditionary forces respectively during the ten year period in question. The six indicators have been added together to compose the two main categories. Although this approach is at risk of masking differences between the countries and between the capabilities it nevertheless gives an impression of the European postures in general. The figure clearly illustrates a heavy trend or a tendency towards focusing on capabilities wired for home land defence.[97] As shown by the graph the eleven states spend almost twice as much on territorial capabilities as compared to expeditionary forces.[98] This is in accordance with the assumptions at the outset. European states were believed to be overly focused on procuring national defence capabilities. The figure yields support to this claim

[97] This trend may look somewhat different with other capabilities comprising the aggregated categories. However, many of the categories such as armoured vehicles and APCs are equipment procured by most states.
[98] Spain is not included in this figure due to its status as a control country. Figure 13.1 found in appendix 1 does however depict the relationship with Spain included in the analysis.



Nevertheless, figure 13 is coarse and lacks specific information as to how the various capabilities distribute themselves between the different kinds of equipment. Figure 14 tries to overcome this by dividing the capabilities into the six original indicators. The data is again shown in absolute numbers for the entire period in question. Figure 14 shows that a focus on armoured vehicles was the dominant procurement during the period. Still the picture is less clear than in figure 13. APCs were also a huge priority during the ten year period, although to a somewhat lesser extent than armoured vehicles.[99] While APCs amounted to 29 904, armoured vehicles reached 31 904 from 2002-2012. The graph also illustrates how comparatively few military helicopters and transport planes were procured. The figures are not very large for heavy artillery or air defence either but they are nevertheless slightly greater.

[99] Spain is again excluded from the analysis. Figure 14.1 in appendix 1 shows how the relationship between the various capacities changes when Spain is included

Figure 14 Distribution Of Capabilites Within The Different Categories, Selected European Countries, 2002-2012



Note: Spain excluded from the graph. * Numbers obtained by adding together the inventories for all the states per year.

Procurement trends aside, it is worth turning the attention towards examining the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Figure 15 is the first attempt to do so.

Figure 15 Proximity To Threat and Focus on Armoured Vehicles



Figure 15 shows the states armoured vehicles averaged over the period between 2002-2012. The figure is fairly clear in demonstrating a trend between proximity to threat and a focus on more heavy material, although this trend is more true for some allies than for others. The figure shows how states in greater proximity to Moscow also are the ones most prone to focus on armoured vehicles. Poland is especially indicative of this trend. The state is very heavily focused. The same is true of Germany, Bulgaria and Romania. Bulgaria is more heavily focused than assumed, given it is the country in the sample with the greatest distance from

Moscow. It has a mean value of 1381,3 armoured vehicles during the period. Germany on the other hand has a mean of 3528,2 armoured vehicles. Poland has a mean of 2403,7. Given its proximity, Poland behaves as predicted. Lithuania and Estonia, however, have no armoured vehicles during the period in question. Although a less heavy focus supports the assumption that these states are more expeditionary oriented, it is not possible to draw this conclusion based solely on figure 15. The states need to be compared according to capacities actually gauging expeditionary priorities for such a conclusion to be drawn. Latvia is the only one of the Baltic States with armoured vehicles. The polynomial line illustrates the trend. Given that the state only has a mean of 3 armoured vehicles it is underrepresented in the graph.

Norway, Denmark, Hungary and Slovakia are all less heavily focused than Poland, Bulgaria and Germany, but more so than the Baltic States. Spain has however, as predicted, fewer armoured vehicles than the majority of the other states. It is also the country farthest away from the political capital of Moscow, something which supports the idea of a relationship between proximity to threat and military procurements. [100]

Figure 16 shows the total number of transport airplanes in absolute figures for the period 2002-2012 plotted against the independent variable of threat perception. Looking at the graph the assumed trend is once again verified. Spain, the country in the most secure position is also the country whit the most expeditionary focus compared to all the other countries. Only Germany is more so with a total value of 362 transport planes. [101] The low scores provided by the rest of the states illustrate an unwillingness to procure larger transport planes, at least on a high scale. Estonia and Latvia have no large transport planes, something which is counter to the assumption of these countries being more expeditionary oriented. When excluding Spain and Germany from the analysis the mean for the rest of the states is 21,5 planes. Lithuania is interesting in this regard. Although grossly underrepresented in the graph it actually has 12 airplanes despite the strict coding applied to the data. This again is indicative of a more global or out of area focus. It is almost half as many planes as Norway (22) and Hungary (23) and only 2 planes fewer than Denmark (14). [102]

[100] Spain does not have the fewest armoured vehicles of all the states. Both Norway and Denmark have fewer (not counting the Baltic states).
[101] Spain has about 348 transport planes during the period.
[102] It was pointed out in an interview that Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria are in fact buying more planes to be used outside their borders. This is however procurements not captured in these data (NATO HQ, Brussels, 30th of April 2013 [Interview]).

The countries expected to have a more heavy focus, such as Poland, have low scores on the y axis in figure 16. In general they confirm the assumed trend with little focus on these kinds of capacities.



Figure 17 illustrates data in absolute numbers as a total for the period in question. Spain is again the most expeditionary oriented state with a score of 8052 armoured personnel carriers, excluding Germany (10306). Spain and Germany focus far more on APCs than the other countries. Bulgaria and Romania are nevertheless quite focused on APCs. In the case of Bulgaria this is somewhat expected. Romania is however acting more lightly than assumed (6066 APCs). The rest of the states behave as predicted. Poland is again confirming the trend with only 799 APCs from 2002-2012. The Baltic States are interesting on this indicator. Although not heavily invested in this type of equipment they have procured some. Latvia with its 13 APCs is the state with the least armoured personnel carriers followed by Estonia (199). Lithuania on the other hand has 600 APCs, a number greater than that of Slovakia. This indicator is consequently indicative of a greater focus on expeditionary forces in all of the Baltic States



Figure 18 shows the analysis first relative measure. The figure depicts transport planes divided by armoured vehicles per year. The numbers are multiplied by 1000 to make them more visually appealing on the graph. This measure is meant to illustrate the relative weight given to one kind of capability as compared to another. The higher the score the more expeditionary focused. Spain is again the most expeditionary oriented state with 0,156 planes per armoured vehicle. The mean on the continent is 0,023. Romania is again lighter than expected. Both Hungary and Germany behave as predicted. The rest of the states have low scores on this indicator, showing that they do not prioritize large airplanes at the expense of armoured vehicles. Lithuania is coded at 100 on this indicator. This is done in order to make its focus solely on transport planes more visible. Estonia and Latvia are coded at 0 since they have no transport airplanes. It would be meaningless to talk about a relative focus on planes as compared to armoured vehicles in these cases.



Figure 19 presents data provided by dividing armoured vehicles with transport planes for each of the years in question. The aim is to investigate the opposite relationship as the one in figure 18. The higher the score, the more do the states focus on armoured vehicles at the expense of transport airplanes. Spain has the lowest score (7) and is again the state with the least heavy focus. This is in line with the assumption about states further away from Moscow being less territorially oriented. Slovakia, Bulgaria and Poland are all heavily focused on this metric. Again, Bulgaria more so than predicted. Nevertheless, the indicator confirms the assumption of a heavy trend in Europe. Latvia is also amongst the states demonstrating a more heavy rather than a light focus. [103] In addition Hungary, Romania, Denmark and Norway are all more heavily focused and tends towards prioritizing armoured vehicles. The three former more so than the latter. Romania has 95,4 armoured vehicles per transport plane. This figure is 50,17 for Norway with the rest of the states falling somewhere in between.[104] The Baltic states, not counting Latvia, are not focused on armoured vehicles at all.

[103] Latvia is coded as 100. It has no airplanes. This is done in order to illustrate its absolute focus on armoured vehicles.
[104] Slovakia was given its armoured vehicle value the last two years (2008,2012). This was done in order to illustrate the greater weight given to this capacity. The state has no airplanes the last two years. It only possess two planes in 2002 and 2005 in comparison with almost 700 armoured vehicles.



The largest capabilities categories in this analysis were armoured personnel carriers and armoured vehicles as demonstrated by figure 14. Given this it would be interesting to see what the states tend to prioritize when they have to choose one over the other. Figure 20 illustrates the total numbers of APCs relative to armoured vehicles. The numbers are again obtained by dividing the former with the latter in each year. A high score indicates a higher focus on APCs. Estonia and Lithuania are coded as 4. This means that they are marginally overrepresented in the graph. This is done to illustrate their focus on APCs, since they have no armoured vehicles during the period. This coding does however runs the risk of being slightly misleading. Spain is the most expeditionary state with a score of 3, 67. Spain does nevertheless have a few armoured vehicles so that the absolute focus is smaller than that found in Estonia and Lithuania. This aspect may justify the coding. Latvia has almost an equal amount of armoured vehicles and APCs. [105] The state is therefore coded as 0,5. All the Baltic States acts as predicted on this indicator, showing a greater expeditionary tendency. The rest of the states behave as predicted. It is interesting to note how both Norway and Denmark are lighter in their focus on this indicator. The same goes for Romania. Slovakia, Poland and Hungary demonstrate a less light focus, in line with the predictions. The trend on the continent appears to be one of moderately light focus.

[105] While Latvia has 13 APCs in 2002, it has 0 the remaining years. In contrast it has 3 main battle tanks (armoured vehicles) per year. 0,5 is chosen to illustrate equal amount of APCs and armoured vehicles

Figure 20 **Threat Proximity And A Tendency Towards Expeditionary Focus**



The data in figure 21 was obtained by dividing the total number of armoured vehicles for the entire period with the total number of military helicopters for the entire period. Dividing the sums omits the problem with missing values in single years. The higher the value, the more heavily focused. Spain is again not particularly heavy in its focus with a value of 13,11. This size appears dwindling when compared to the Polish score of 59,7 and the Norwegian of 187,8. Norway is extremely heavily oriented on this metric, due its few military helicopters. The rest of the states behave as predicted. They demonstrate a tendency towards armoured vehicles at the expense of military helicopters. Estonia and Lithuania are coded at 0. The former has neither helicopters nor armored vehicles. The latter has 36 helicopters but no armoured vehicles. The mean value for the states on this metric is 32,77, without counting Norway, Lithuania and Estonia. The mean value can be interpreted as meaning a tendency towards procuring 32,7 armoured vehicles per helicopter procured.



In order to illustrate how the states distribute themselves when it comes to military helicopters alone, this capacity is presented in figure 22. The figure is showing the total number of military helicopters for the entire period in absolute numbers. The most striking feature is how many helicopters Germany has. As does Romania. The other states have fewer. Spain has more helicopters than nine out of the eleven states, only bypassed by Germany and Romania. Norway, Denmark and Latvia have the fewest helicopters. Poland on the other hand has quite a few and scores relatively high on this indicator as compared to the ones illustrated earlier. The indicator does not illustrate as clear a relationship as provided by the other metrics. Nevertheless, many countries have low scores. This is in line with the predictions. It is however noteworthy that the focus on this capacity overall is small ranging from 766 (Germany) to 6 (Norway).



Figure 23 shows the total heavy artillery in absolute numbers for the entire period. States with high scores are also the most heavily oriented. Germany is the state with the most heavy artillery in the sample. The other states are also prone to focusing on this capability although to a lesser extent. Romania and Poland in particularly heavy in their focus, with a large amount of heavy artillery. Estonia has heavy artillery although not to the extent as the other states. The mean value for heavy artillery amongst the states is about 1000 as compared to about 200 for helicopters. The interesting part with this metric however is that Spain is no lighter in its focus than the rest of the states. Heavy artillery cannot yield support to the idea of proximity to threat and a focus on heavy arms. It does however illustrate a heavy trend in Europe. This is in line with the predictions.



The data provided in figure 24 is given as the total, in absolute numbers for the entire period. On this metric, Poland and Germany stands out as being extremely heavily focused. The other states focus on this to a lesser extent. What is worth noting is that all the states have anti-aircraft systems. Spain is lighter in its focus on this metric as well although not significantly so. With a total score of 464 it is only lighter than four of the countries, namely Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Germany. Slovakia on the other hand behaves as predicted with a fairly high focus on anti-aircraft systems. The trend is again a somewhat lighter focus away from Moscow, but not overly so.



After having investigated various metrics pertaining to say something about states focus on some capacities relative to others, and the tendencies to procure equipment within the six categories, an assessment of the states output, that is *how much* they spend is needed. More importantly it is desirable to see whether the amount of GDP spent on defence follows the predicted path.



Figure 25 illustrates the percentage of GDP spent on defence averaged over the period in question. In order to assess the relative effort of the selected states it is instructive to look at the percentage of GDP that each state devotes towards its own defence. NATO has a goal of 2 % of GDP spent on defence (NATO HQ, Brussels, 29th of April, [Interview]). However, none of the states meet the 2 % target recognized by NATO in absolute numbers. Bulgaria did nonetheless spend 2,21 % of GDP on average during the period. Similarly, Poland and Estonia are close to spending 2 % of their GDP. Poland spends 1,87% and Estonia 1,88 % respectively. Many of the states are characterized by spending increasingly less towards their own defence. The only exceptions are Poland and Estonia which are actually increasing their defence spending (NATO HQ, Brussels, 29th of April [Interview]). In some of the countries the spending is as low as 0,8 %. The majority of the states do however spend somewhere between 1,1% and 1,4% on defence. [106] When plotting the average defence spending against the independent variable of threat perception an interesting pattern arises. While the states in closest proximity to Moscow also are the ones which spends most on their defence, Spain is

[106] The dataset pertaining the defence spending amongst the chosen European states can be found in appendix 5.

the state that spends the least. The other states in the sample fall somewhere in between with Norway and Romania spending more than the remaining countries. [107]

5.0 Empirical summary: Discussion of the findings

5.1 Assessing the hypotheses

The fewer indicators used in order to test the hypotheses, the more difficult it can be to illustrate the desired trend. In this thesis six indicators, as provided by the dependent variable were utilized. These yielded largely the same results although, not all of them were found useful in illustrating the hypotheses. Despite this, five out of the six actually illustrated the assumed relationship between threat proximity and military procurements. The only indicator which could not confirm the link between proximity to threat and military postures was heavy artillery. That being said, it nevertheless illustrated, as did all the others, how the chosen allies still continue to focus on heavy arms. Spain was about as heavily oriented as the rest of the states on this indicator. Germany, Poland and Romania did however follow the expected patterns and continued to procure heavy artillery.

The more indicators analyzed in different ways confirming the predicted trends, the more confidence can be associated with the findings. In this thesis the various capacities were shown as means, absolute numbers and relative measures. In relation to the hypotheses postulated at the outset the indicators can be said to help confirm them in the following manner:

H1: European states spend overall disproportionately on territorial defence capabilities.

H1 receives strong support by the metrics devised in this thesis. The hypotheses was primarily measured by aggregating the numbers of territorial defence capabilities and those of expeditionary forces and later comparing which one was the largest of the two. In figure 13 these aggregate numbers clearly illustrated that the overall trend among the European countries was towards home land defence capabilities. This was true even when the capacities were divided into the six original categories and compared. Nevertheless, the difference between such capabilities as APCs and armoured vehicles was quite small. The former

[107] Figure 25.1 in appendix 1 illustrates the descending trend amongst the European states when it comes to defence spending.

increased substantially once Spain was included in the analysis. This, although increasing the total expeditionary capacity among the states, nevertheless helped strengthen the hypotheses. If Spain truly is more expeditionary than the rest of the states, then its inclusion should contribute to an increase in these kinds of capabilities without a similar increase within the category for territorial defence. This is largely what happened. While the category for home land defence only increased by 3197 with the inclusion of Spain, the expeditionary forces category increased with 8573. Although being a coarse measure without the ability to capture inter-country differences it nonetheless points to a broader trend amongst the countries.

H2: There exists a positive relationship between proximity to threat and investment in territorial defense capabilities.

H2 received strong support as well, in that several different metrics illustrated the predicted trends. The hypotheses was largely confirmed by a series of different measures, both gauging the trade-offs between different capabilities and the focus on single capacities. Figure 15 illustrated the tendency towards a focus on armoured vehicles as a function of proximity to threat. The closest states to Moscow were also the states which had the most armoured vehicles. Poland was especially heavily oriented as was Germany, Bulgaria and Romania. Spain was on the other hand amongst the countries with the fewest armoured vehicles, something which adds weight to the hypotheses. On other metrics, especially the ones aimed at illustrating the trade-offs between different capacities, the same trend was discernable. When dividing transport planes with armored vehicles as in figure 18, Spain once again came out as the state with the largest expeditionary capacity, not counting Germany. The rest of the states scored low on this metric with a mean value of 25,8 planes relative to armoured vehicles. The fact that Germany in many instances proved to be more expeditionary than Spain need not weaken the findings. Larger states are often in a different position than smaller ones, meaning they often procure equipment of different kinds because they can. Smaller states do not have this opportunity and therefore often have to choose (NATO HQ, Brussels, 29th of April 2013 [Interview]). Besides, if Germany were to undermine the tendencies discovered in the data material it would have to be significantly less heavily focused than it is today. [108]

[108] The point is that even though Germany has a lot of transport planes compared to the other smaller states, the numbers are not so great when compared to their heavy equipments. As an example, while Germany procured around 90 airplanes on average during the period it simultaneously procured over 3500 armoured vehicles.

H3: There exists a positive relationship between the absence of external threat and the amount of GDP spent on defence. Secure states will tend to under finance their defence.

H3 also received support despite the fact that not all the states behave as predicted. Although none of the states in the sample are secure per se, it makes sense to talk about relative security based on distance. The country at greatest distance from Moscow, Bulgaria, did however not confirm the prediction. Instead of spending less on defence the state is actually amongst the biggest spenders with an average over the period of 2,2 % of GDP. Norway, Germany, Slovakia, Denmark and Hungary do however behave as predicted with a defence spending ranging from 1,3 % to 1,64 %. Amongst the more proximate states only Poland and Estonia spends as much as would be predicted. Their total amounts to almost 2 % of GDP. Romania spends no more than Norway and the other Baltic States spend even less. Plotting Spain against the independent variable does however illustrate the predicted trend. No state considered in this thesis spends less than Spain. Since it is also the state in the most secure position this helps strengthen the hypothesis.

H4: Small allies will tend to balance internally within the alliance. This translates into a focus on expeditionary forces. This is true even when threatened by an external aggressor

H4 receives qualified support and is to a larger extent dependent on which metric is being deployed. Although some of the indicators clearly illustrated a more expeditionary focus among the Baltic States, this was not the case for all of them on all the indicators. In some instances they even demonstrated a more heavy rather than a lighter focus in their procurements. Unlike Blagden and Menon it is not possible to conclude that the three Baltic states have anything resembling large transport airplanes capacity. Although Lithuania does have 12 air planes, the other two states have 0. The only metric which yielded a more expeditionary focus for all three states were APCs. All three countries had procurements in this category. What is more, this was, with the exception of Latvia, followed by no focus whatsoever on armoured vehicles. This finding can be said to strengthen the hypotheses although the picture is not as clear as with the other hypotheses.

To summarize, all the indicators, even the ones unable to say anything about any relationship between the dependent and independent variable, illustrated a heavy trend among the European allies. The fact that states such as Poland behaved consistently across differing capacities only adds weight to these findings. In addition the heavy focus was largely accompanied by comparatively low procurements within the expeditionary categories.

5.1.1 Sources of error

5.2.2 The coding

Even though the findings were largely supportive of the predictions at the outset it can be instructive to discuss possible sources of error. If the findings of a study are not attributable to the measurements taking place it can pose a huge problem for the internal validity of that study (Bryman 2004:72-73). First of all questions can be raised regarding how the variables, and particularly the dependent variable was coded. Although the allocation of different weapons was based on military function, some judgment had to be made. In some categories, such as the military helicopter category, some medium sized helicopters with shorter range and lesser transportation abilities were included. This may have affected the results by over representing this capability for certain states in particular years. In addition to this it is possible that some of the equipment could have been categorized differently. This could also have provided different results. For instance, Blagden and Menon group APCs with main battle tanks and other armoured vehicles. Since APCs are considered to be more of an expeditionary capacity. It is however not done in this thesis. The results obtained in the two analyses are therefore somewhat different. The amount of heavy ground forces is smaller in this thesis than in the original paper by Blagden and Menon. [109]

In addition to this other categories could have been chosen as the indicators on the dependent variable. C3, offensive electronic warfare/suppression of enemy air defenses are some examples (Heisbourg 2000:11). These are however capabilities which a lot of the eleven states lack. It would be meaningless to compare states on capabilities none of them possess.

Some of the proxies chosen may not give good enough information about true military spending. H3 was measured by establishing how many of the states spent 2 % of GDP or more on defence. Although comparing how much of the GDPs states spend on defence may yield some insights as to who spends little and who spends more it has been argued that GDP does not say much about actual capabilities. "NATO countries have a tendency to narrow the

[109] If it is in fact the case that heavy ground forces are underrepresented in the thesis this actually strengthens the findings. If it was possible to discover a heavy trend without taking all the relevant equipments into consideration, the trend is more likely to be a real one

discourse on capabilities to the question of European NATO members failing to spend at least 2 % of GDP on defence. [...] The 2 % target seems like an easily applicable and charmingly straightforward instrument to gauge the sincerity of allies commitment. However, the link between defence spending as a percentage of GDP and actual military capabilities is tenuous" (Havránek, Jires & Suplata 2013:2). There are many reasons for this. First of all percentage of GDP does not necessarily say anything about the sort of capabilities that allies buy. Secondly the 2 % requirement says little about whether the country actually spends money on capabilities. "Almost half of NATO countries are spending more than 60 % of their defence budgets on personnel. Excluding Belgium, all of them are located in Europe´s east or south" (Havránek et. al 2013:3).

Another, potentially bigger problem, is conversely the fact that a lot of the weapons in Eastern Europe are old. The states possess a large amount of Soviet style equipment. Much of these are not yet configured in accordance with NATO standards, meaning they cannot be made available for the Alliance. A significant amount of the hardware was procured some time during the Cold War. This is true of equipments found in all the six categories on the dependent variable. However, if they were considered obsolete, they would probably not have been maintained, or upgraded as some of them have been. There is no contradiction between having new, modern weapons which are directed towards a symmetric threat[110] (NATO, HQ, Brussels, 30th of April 2013 [Interview]).

5.2.3 The analysis

Questions about how the variables were coded are off course important, but it is also important to be aware of the way they were later treated in the analysis. In this analysis some of the states were given random values to indicate their absolute or relative focus on some metrics. This was done in order to be able to say something meaningful about the postures of these states. Such an approach does however runs the risk of grossly over represent, or in other instances under represent the true value of these states. Caution should therefore be applied when drawing conclusions about the nature of these states procurements and what they mean.

[110] Ground-based air defence was used as an example. This is a weapon directed against a symmetrical threat. They can nevertheless be modern, new weapons (e.g. they don´t have to be old in order to be directed against "old" threats). (NATO HQ, Brussels, 30th of April 2013 [Interview]).

Given that only four years during the ten year period were gauged, this also has the potential of distorting the numbers obtained. This may mask real trends, since the numbers may vary in the years not measured. Given the degree of continuity discovered in the data actually gauged, this is however not assumed to be a big problem. It is conversely important to keep in mind that since only certain capabilities are being measured the conclusions drawn from such measurements can only relate to the data actually retrieved. This may not be exhaustive, but in this case it is assumed to give the impression of certain tendencies. Another possibility is that the data obtained is simply allocated to early. It could be that the states are exhibiting such an "old fashioned" force structure due to the fact that they have not yet had the time to reorganize their militaries. "The restructuring of the military takes time. Weapons bought 10 years ago are just being delivered" (NATO HQ, Brussels, 30th of May 2013 [Interview]). Many of the states in this thesis are relatively new to the alliance. The only exceptions are Norway and Denmark which were accessed in 1949. Spain became a member in 1982. The Federal Republic of Germany became a member in 1955 while Poland and Hungary got admitted in 1999. [111] The remaining six states became members as late as 2004 (NATO, 2013). It is possible that this has influenced and still is influencing the strategic postures of these states. Nevertheless if membership is a significant factor in understanding military procurements, it cannot explain the heavy focus demonstrated by Norway, Denmark and Germany - all "old" members.

5.2.2 Alternative explanations for the findings

Can other factors than proximity to threat help illuminate the findings? Three alternative explanations are provided:

"When you are rich you can afford all kinds of luxuries. You can buy whatever you like to make yourself comfortable. If you buy a car you can afford buying all the extra parts, like a new stereo and other things to improve it. If you are poor however you cannot afford all this. And if you have to cut back it would be wise to take out the stereo not the engine" (Cook, 8.5.2013 [Phone interview]).

The quote by Paul Cook refers to a situation of limited monetary resources. "Many countries are as we speak consumed with financial crisis" (Cook, 2013 8th of May [Phone interview]).

[111] The reunited Germany became a member in 1990

If a state is pressured financially it is more likely to value Article 5, collective defence of its own territory over acquiring expeditionary capacity. This was a view shared by many of the informants at the NATO HQ as well. "Securing your own land comes first" (Cook, 2013 8th of May [Phone interview]). And in the same token: "If expeditionary forces were cheap, the states could simply buy them to be a good ally"(NATO HQ, 29th of April 2013). Although this may be true, there are certain indicators throughout the thesis which shows that economy does not explain military postures any better than proximity to threat. Germany demonstrated a relatively heavy focus, despite being both large and wealthy. [112] At the other end of the spectrum, small, poorer states, such as the Baltic States demonstrated a greater tendency towards acquiring expeditionary forces at the expense of territorially wired capabilities all together. Financial capacity may therefore have something to do with it, but it can hardly explain the whole phenomenon

The size of states is also a factor often mentioned in relation to defense spending. There are several reasons for this. Smaller sates are first of all more willing to listen to the signals coming from NATO regarding defence spending than are larger ones. Secondly they seldom have the ability to acquire all kinds of equipments. They have to prioritize. Since they cannot afford a full spectrum defence force they have to specialize, leaving other to do for them what they cannot do for themselves (Cook, 8th of April 2013 [Phone interview]. Nevertheless, a state´s size does not seem to be the most important aspect when deciding upon what to procure. Surely size matters, but given the data provided from the ten year period, size is but one of the determinants. Instead smaller states seem to base their procurements on threat assessments, where they perceive themselves to be more at risk than do larger ones.

The last explanation for the small defence budgets and relatively heavy focus in Europe is domestic factors. Waging war is not going to win the elections. Rather the public is concerned with health, education and other social services. Besides, it can be difficult to legitimize participation in operations abroad to the people at home (NATO HQ, 30th of April 2013 [Interview]). This may have some implications for how much the states spend, downsizing their forces to provide for other services. Nevertheless, it cannot explain on *what* the states chose to spend their money. It is more likely that this has something to do with the perceived

[112] Larger, wealthier states often procure more of both kinds of equipments because they can. They don´t feel the same monetary constrains as smaller states. They will therefore more often than not have a greater degree of a full spectrum force structure (NATO HQ, Brussels, 30th of April [Interview]).

threat, rather than some other indicators. A state will not buy equipment unless it is deemed necessary for national security, especially not in times of economic hardship

5.3 A more modern European defence structure? European states as the last Cold Warriors

"Europe is still in a Cold War mindset. It has been slow to restructure their defence" (Cook, 8th of May 2013 [Phone interview]).

This thesis seems to illustrate an overly heavy focus among the chosen European NATO countries. Although not all metrics yielded the same result, they nevertheless pointed more or less to the same trend. One disadvantage with providing the data as means or totals for the entire period is that it masks potential inter-year shifts in defence spending and procurements. Some of the data from IISS indicates that although Europe seems to continue their focus in the same vein as during the Cold War, there may be some changes ahead. To illustrate: While Norway procured around 320 armoured vehicles from 2002-2008 this figure dropped to 156 in 2012 (IISS 2012: 141). Similarly Germany went from procuring around 4600 armoured vehicles during 2002,2005 and 2008 to a mere 873 in 2012. This is however not particular for these two countries, rather it is a trend seen among all the countries in the sample. The only exception is Poland which actually procured more armoured vehicles in 2012 than in any of the previous years (IISS 2012:118,143-144).

The trend is towards less procurements within all branches of weapons, both nationally oriented and expeditionary forces. This is true for all states except a few. Spain did for example procure more helicopters in 2012 than in 2008. Bulgaria on the other hand, went from procuring almost 1700 armoured vehicles in 2008 to just about 461 in 2012.

6.0 Conclusion: The continued relevance of threat.

"The Europeans are used to a risky world. They have always had a greater proximity to threat" (Cook, 8.5.2013 [Phone interview]).

When talking about security in general and European security in particular an understanding of what guides states priorities and planning is of importance. Since it can be difficult to gauge such phenomenon's as "intentions" or "wishes", it can be instructive to measure what the states actually procure. Action may speak louder than words and be more indicative of the security views *actually* held by the allies.

The question of defence spending and procurements in NATO-Europe has since the end of the Cold War been a question of "how to create something out of nothing". With decreasing budgets and a more rhetorical than real threat on the European continent the states seem to forego military spending where this stands in the way of domestic priorities. Especially wealthier countries are known to spend little towards their own defence. The main explanations of European defence spending, or lack thereof are well established in the academic literature. By referring to free riding, strategic abdication, economy or post-modernism. This thesis argues against these established explanations. In doing so it provides an alternative explanation of the NATO-Europeans military procurements. Instead of being misinformed it would be more accurate to claim that Europe is misunderstood. The military spending and procurements on the continent are largely explainable through an examination of threat perceptions. According to Steven M. Walt´s balance of threat theory states tend to balance against the largest perceived *threat*, not necessarily the most powerful state in the system. On the European continent there is only one threat in the classical sense left, namely Russia. Russia has a large military capacity and is still considered to be one of the biggest military powers in the world. Although Russia is not threatening to use military force in the region, many of the European allies plan their military structures according to a classical

military threat. This is despite the fact that Russia, according to the official NATO view, is considered a partner.

The Chosen sample for the thesis aimed at testing the claim about European allies being far from irrational in their military procurements. By devising several quantitative metrics this claim has been investigated. The postures of the European allies were predominantly proven to be wired towards heavy capabilities aimed at defending national territories. The trend was surprisingly homogenous, although some exceptions were encountered. What is more, this trend seemed to increase with increased distance to the Russian capital city. The data material and the trends encountered makes it hard to conclude that other factors than threat or threat perceptions could explain the findings. Given that a control variable was included by adding Spain to the analysis, this only helps strengthen the assumption.

Nevertheless, some trends encountered in the original paper by Blagden and Menon could not be proven in this thesis. Blagden and Menon found the Baltic States to be especially expeditionary oriented regarding logistical air power, but no such finding could be merited here. In fact, counter to their findings, these particular states were deemed to be relatively less expeditionary focused in their air power. Despite this it was discovered that all the Baltic States had some expeditionary capacity. They were all procuring armoured personnel carriers, a capacity taken to indicate an expeditionary focus.

Bibliography

Advantages and disadvantages of Microsoft Excel. [Accessed 8.2.2013] Available at: http://www.ehow.com/facts_4814365_advantages-disadvantages-microsoft-excel.html

Ashdown, P (2011). Europe's free ride on the back of NATO is over [Accessed 25.10.2012] Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8862810/Europes-free-ride-on-the-back-of-Nato-is-over.html

Barston, R, P., (1971). "The External Relations of Small States". In August Schou & Arne Brundtland (ed.). *Small States in International Relations*. Printed in Sweden by Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri AB, Uppsala 1971,

Blagden, D.W & A. Menon (2012). "Strategy and Threat perceptions: Explaining Variations in European Military Postures". Paper for presentation at the 53rd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA, USA, 1-4 April 2012.

Blagden, D, W., Levy, J, S. & Thompson, W, R. (2011). "Correspondence: Sea powers, Continental Powers and Balancing Theory". *International Security,* Vol.36, No.2 (Fall 2011), pp.190-202.

Boyd, H (2013). Research associate for defence and military analysis, IISS. Personal communication, 14.05.2013 [e-mail]

Brewer, J & Hunter, A. (1989)."Foundations of Multimethod Research: Synthesizing Styles". Sage Publications.

Bryman, A (2004). *Social Research Methods.* Second Edition. Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, M & Unterseher, L. (1988)."Is there a tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets". *International Security,* Vol. 13,. No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp 5-49.

Chaney, R (2012). Advantages of Microsoft Office Excel [Accessed 8.2.2013]Available at: http://www.ehow.com/list_7163167_advantages-microsoft-office-excel.html

Cooper, R (2003). Interesting quotes. [Accessed 24.10.2012] Available at: http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu/interesting-quotes/

Cornish, P. (1997). *Partnership in Crisis: The US, Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO.* The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Davidson, Jason W. *"America's Allies and War: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq*", Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2011

Daalder, I. & Goldgeier, J. (2006).Global NATO. *Foreign Affairs 105 2005.*

Duffy, M, E. (1987). "Methodological Triangulation: A vehicle for Merging quantitative and qualitative methods". *Journal of Nursing Scholarship*

Evans, K (2012). The disadvantages of spreadsheets [Accessed 8.2.2012] Available at: http://www.ehow.com/list_7163167_advantages-microsoft-office-excel.html

Foster, D (2012). Disadvantages of using Microsoft Excel [Accessed 8.2.2013]Available at: http://www.ehow.com/list_6536790_disadvantages-using-microsoft-excel.html

Gates, R. M. (2011a). US defense chief blasts Europe over NATO, Brussels 10 of June 2011. [Accessed: 17.10.2012] Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/10/nato-dismal-future-pentagon-chief

Gates, R. M. (2011b). Europeans Retreat on Defense Spending.[Accessed 24.10.2012] Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903461304576524503625829970.html

Gilpin, R.G. (1984). "The richness of the tradition of political realism". *International Organization.* Vol 38, Issue 02, March 1984 pp. 287-304.

Hallams, E. and Schreer, B. (2012) "Towards a Post-American alliance?"NATO Burden-Sharing after Libya*", International Affairs 88, pp. 313-327*

Hani, Dr. (2009). Replication Study [Accessed 14.3.2013] Available at: http://explorable.com/replication-study

Hartley, K.& Sandler, T. (1999). "NATO burden-sharing: Past and Future". *Journal of Peace Research.Vol. 36, no.6, 1999, pp. 665-680.*

Havránek, J., Jires, & Milan, S. (2013). "Maintaining Defence Capabilities: European Share" [Accessed 17.05.2013] Available at: http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/maintaining-defence-capabilities-european-share

Heisbourg, F. (2000)."Europe´s Strategic Ambitions: The limits of Ambiguity". *Survival*, Vol 42, No.2 Summer 2000, pp. 5-15.

Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. & Perraton, J. (1999). *Global Transformations. Politics, Economics and Culture.* Polity Press.

Hobbes, T (1651). *Leviathan*, Chapter 13 Of the natural condition of mankind as concerning their felicity and misery, paragraph 13.8. Published April 1651.

Hovi, J. (2008). *Spillteori: En innføring*. Universitetsforlaget:2008.

IISS (1980). *Militær Balansen 1980-1981*. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Norsk utgave ved Den norske Atlanterhavskomité.

IISS (1984). *Militær Balansen 1984-1985*. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Norsk utgave ved Den norske Atlanterhavskomité.

IISS (2002). *The Military Balance.* London: International Institute for Strategic Studies .

IISS (2005). *The Military Balance.* London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

IISS (2008). *The Military Balance.* London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

IISS (2012). *The military Balance.* London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

James, A., D (2006). "The transatlantic defence R & D gap: Causes, consequences and controversies". *Defence and Peace Economics*, 17:3, 223-238.

Kagan, R (2003). Interview: Robert. March 12, 2003. [Accessed 08.02.2013] Available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/blair/interviews/kagan.html.

Kagan, R (2002). "Power and Weakness: Why the United States and Europe see the world differently", *Policy Review no. 113. June-July 2002.*

Khanna, J. & Sandler, T. (2007). "Conscription, peace-keeping, and foreign assistance: NATO burden sharing in the post-cold war era", *Defence and Peace Economics, 8:1, 101-121.*

Kupchan, C, A. (1988). "NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior". *International Organization,* Vol. 42, No. 2 (Spring, 1988), pp. 317-346.

Larrabee, F., S, Johnson, S., E, Gordon IV, J., Wilson, P., A, Baxter, C., Lai, D. & Trenkov-Wermuth, C. (2012). "NATO and the Challenges of Austerity". *National Defense research institute.*

Labarre, F. & Frank, J. (2003). "The Transatlantic Gap: Permanent or Temporary?" [Accessed 1.4.2013] Available at: http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/07_tag_01_lab.pdf

Layne, Christopher (2003)."Transatlantic Relations and the Future of NATO in the Wake of the Second Gulf War", *Policy Analysis* No. 483. August 2003. [Accessed 17.09.2012] Available at: http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa483.pdf

Lemoine, J (2012). Advantages of Microsoft Excel. [Accessed 8.2.2013]. Available at: http://www.ehow.com/facts_4967587_advantages-microsoft-excel.html

Levy, J, S. & Thompson, W, R. (2010). "Balancing on land and at sea". *International security, Vol. 35, No. 1 (*Summer 2010), pp.7-43

Lindley-French, J (2002). "In the shade of Locarno? Why European defence is failing". *International Affairs 78, 4 (2002) pp. 789-811.*

Lindley-French, J. (2007). *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: The enduring Alliance.* Routledge.

Locatelli, A (2007). "The technology gap in transatlanctic relations: A cause of tension or a tool of operation?" *Journal of Transatlantic studies,* 5:2, 133-154.

Lundestad, G. (1986). "Empire by invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952". *Journal of Peace Research* 1986 23:263.

Mathews, T, J. (1997). "Power Shift".76 *Foreign Affairs.50.1997*

Matlary, H. J & Østerud, Ø. (ed.) (2007). *Denationalisation of Defense: Convergence and Diversity.* Ashgate, 2007.

NATO (2013). NATO. [Accessed 20.05.2013] Available at: http://snl.no/NATO

Newhouse, J. (1997)."Europe's Rising Regionalism", *Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 1. Jan - Feb,. 1997,pp. 67-84.*

Noetzel, T. & Scheer, B. (2009). "Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic alliance and the process of strategic change", *International Affairs 85:2 (2009) pp. 211-226.*

O´ Hanlon, M (1997). "Transforming NATO: The Role of European Forces", *Survival, vol. 39, no.3, Autumn 1997, pp. 5.15.*

Olson, M (1965). *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups*, President and Fellows of Harvard College.

Olson, M & Zeckhauser, R. (1966). "An Economic Theory of Alliances", *The Review of Economics and Statistics,* Vol.48, No.3 (Aug., 1966), pp. 266-279.

Oneal, J.R & Elrod, M.A (1989). "NATO burden sharing and the forces of change". *International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 1989, pp. 435-456.*

Perlo-Freeman, S., Cooper, J,. Ismail, O,. Kelly, N,. Sköns, E,. & Solmirano, C. (2011)."Military expenditure data" in *SIPRI yearbook 2011: Armaments, disarmament and international security.* Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Perlo-Freeman, S., Cooper, J,. Ismail, O,. Sköns, E,. & Solmirano, C. (2011)."Military expenditure" in *SIPRI yearbook 2011: Armaments, disarmament and international security.* Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Rasmussen, A. F. (2011). Europeans Retreat on Defence Spending. [Acsessed 24.10.2012] Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903461304576524503625829970.html

Repstad, P. (1993). *Mellom nærhet og distanse: Kvalitative metoder i samfunnsfag.* Universitetsforlaget. Oslo.

Rice, C. (2000). "Promoting the National Interest". *Foreign Affairs* nr. 45. 2000

Ringsmose, J. (2009). "Paying for protection – the military expenditures of small allied states". [Accessed 20.09.2012] Available at: http://busieco.samnet.sdu.dk/politics/nyheder_og_begivenheder/jr.pdf

Risjord, M, W., Dunbar, S, B. & Moloney, M, F. (2002). "A new Foundation for Methodological Triangulation". *Journal of Nursing Scholarship.*

Rocecrance, R, N., (1966). Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future. [Accessed 5.05.2013] Available at: http://www.sharework.net/www/cuny-gc/intl-politics/bi-polarity-multipolarity-future-richard-rosecrance.pdf

Royal Air Force (2013). Support helicopters. [Accessed: 20.05.2013] Available at: http://www.raf.mod.uk/organisation/supporthelicopter.cfm

Rynning, S. (2012). *NATO in Afghanistan: The liberal disconnect.* Stanford University Press. Stanford, California.

Sandler, T. & Hartley, K. (2001). "Economics of Alliances: Lessons for Collective Action". *Journal of Economic Literature* 39: 869-896.

Shuttleworth, M (2009). Reproducibility [Accessed 15.3.2013] Available at: http://explorable.com/reproducibility

Shuttleworth, M (2008). Validity and Reliability [Accessed 15.3.2013] Available at: http://explorable.com/validity-and-reliability

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2013). SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. [Accessed1.3.2013] Available at: http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2012). SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Database [Accessed 1.3.2013] Available at: http://milexdata.sipri.org/

Snyder, G. H. (1984). "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics", *World Politcs*, Vol 36, No. *4 (Jul., 1984). Pp. 461 – 495.*

Snyder, G. H (2002). Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay. *International Security* 2002 Vol. 27, No. 1, Pages 149-173.

Snyder, J. (1991). "*Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition"*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Sperling, J. & Webber, M. (2009). NATO: From Kosovo to Kabul. *International Affairs 85:3, pp. 491-511.*

The Harmel Report (1967). The Harmel Report: Full reports by the rapporteurs on the future tasks of the Alliance. [Accessed: 31.08.2012] Available at: http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/nato-strategy/Harmel_Report_complete.pdf

Toje, A &, B., Kuntz (2012). *Neoclassical realism in European politics: bringing power back in*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Venneson, P., Bruer, F., de Franco, C., & Scroeder, C. U. (2009). "Is there a European Way of War?: Role conceptions, Organizational Frames, and the Utility of Force", *Armed Forces & Society, Vol 35, No.4 July 2009, pp.628-645.*

Walt, S. M. (1985). "Alliance formation and balance of world power". *International Security, Vol. 9, No 4 (spring, 1985), 3-43.*

Walt, S.M. (1987). *The origins of Alliances.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth (1959). *Man, the state and War: A theoretical analysis.* Columbia University Press New York and London.

Waltz, Kenneth (2000). "NATO expansions: A realists view", *Contemporary Security Policy, 21:2, 23-38.*

Waltz, Kenneth (1993)."The Emerging Structure of International Politics". *International Security*, Vol. 18, No 2, pp. 44-79.

Waltz, Kenneth (1988)."The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18:615-628.*

Witney, N (2008). "Re-energising Europes´s Security and defence policy", *European Council of foreign relations, July 2008.*

Wolff, J (2006). *An introduction to political philosophy*. Oxford University Press.

Yost, S. D (2000). "The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union". *Survival, vol. 42. no.4, Winter 2000-2001, pp. 97-128.*

Appendix

Appendix 1

Figure 13.1 shows how the relationship between the categories changes once Spain is included in the analysis. The difference between the two types of capabilities decreases. This is mainly due to Spain´s greater investment in expeditionary capabilities.



Figure 14.1 illustrate the distribution within the different categories once Spain is included. The total number for APCs rises significantly. ** The data from the figures were taken from IISS the military balance 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2012 editions.



* Figure 25.1 shows the defence spending among the countries from 2002-2012. Spain spends the least during the entire period. Bulgaria is spending the most.



Appendix 2

Detailed coding of the dependent variable. [113]

1) Armoured vehicles: All main battle tanks and IFVs for a given country in a given year.

2) Heavy artillery: Coded as artillery of 155 mm or over. In some cases are artillery of 152 mm included. 152 mm is however the lowest limit of inclusion

3) Air defence/Anti-aircraft systems: Includes larger guns, surface to air missiles, HAWK launchers, Gepard Sp, Roland Sp, Nasams (battery), anti air artillery, Sa-6, Sa-7, Sa-8, Sa-9, Sa-3, Sa-4, Sa-5, L/70, BTR-60, PsKbil m/42D, OT-90, RB-70, Sa-13, Pac-3 patriot, Osa-ak, Ganef, sa-5 gammon, 9k33 Osa, asrad 02 elot, C-ram mantis, 2k12 kub, Nasams 2. Excludes manpads, hand held guns, mistral and stinger,

4) APC: All armoured personnel carriers for a given state in a given year. Both wheeled and tracked are included. Protected Patrol vehicles are also included where relevant.

5) Transport Planes: Includes larger planes able to perform strategic airlift. Models included are: C-130 H Hercules, C-130B Hercules, C-130 H Hercules, C-130J Hercules, Transall C-160, An-26, C-295, CJ-27 Spartan, Casa C-295 M, A310 MRTT,/MRT. C-212, A-310,B 707, C-212, CN-235. Smaller air planes primarily used for domestic purposes are excluded.

6) Military Helicopters: The category is composed of both transport and support helicopters. The models are: Mi-24V, Aw 101 Merlin, IAR-330 puma, AS532AL Cougar, Lynx mk86, CH-53G, mi-8,m-17,mi-9, Mi-2urn,sa-330,ch-53g stallion, Nh 90, UH-1D, Mi-2URN,SA-330, AS 532U2, IAR-330 puma, HU-21, CH-47.

[113] ***** The specific type of weapon included in a category is only mentioned if unclear. Certain categories are used as the IISS lists them. 0 categories will not describe in detail the weapons composing them. For more information see IISS *The Military Balance* 2002,2005,2008 and 2012 editions.

* The independent variable was coded in the following manner:

Country:	**Distance in km:**
Bulgaria	1782
Denmark	1592
Estonia	898
Germany	1621
Hungary	1563
Latvia	854
Lithuania	791
Norway	1677
Poland	1138
Romania	1477
Slovakia	1611
Spain	3452

Appendix 3

Research interviews

Bayless, Ian. Staff Officer Capabilities. Defence Capabilities Section. Defence Policy and Planning Division (DPP). NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 30th of April 2013.

Bjørseth, Pål. Deputy Defence Advisor. Defence Affairs Section. Norwegian Delegation To NATO. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 29th of April 2013.

Boland, Frank. Director of Planning. Defence Policy and Planning Division (DPP). NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 29th of April 2013.

Budd, Andrew. Defence Capabilities Section. Defence Policy and Planning Division (DPP). NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 30th of April 2013.

Carson, Neil. Technology and Risk Assessment Officer. Capability Delivery Section. Defence Investment. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 30th of April 2013.

Cook, Paul. Assistant Secretary General. Director, Economics and Security Committee & The Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group. NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Telephone interview, 8th of May 2013.

Drake, Gordon. Land Force Analyst and PARP Country Officer. Defence Policy and Planning Division (DPP). NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 29th of April 2013

Jonsdottir, Sigurborg Asta. Officer Policy, Plans and Partnerships Section. Strategy Directorate. Defence Investment. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 30th of April 2013.

Saveraux, Paul. Defence Capabilities Section. Defence Policy and Planning Division (DPP). NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 29th of April 2013.

Vaglum, Henning. Defence Advisor. Permanent representative of Norway in the Executive Working Group and the Defence Review Committee. Norwegian Delegation to NATO. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 29th of April 2013.

Vroemen, Gustav. Air Force Analyst and PARP Country Officer. Defence Policy and Planning Division (DPP). NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 29th of April 2013.

Appendix 4

* Data depicting territorial defence capabilities for all countries. Spain, being the control country is presented in the color red.

Norway	Armoured Vehicles	Norway	Heavy artillery	Norway	Air defence**
2002	327	**2002**	184	**2002**	24
2005	322	**2005**	172	**2005**	0
2008	322	**2008**	138	**2008**	0
2012	156	**2012**	54	**2012**	0
Bulgaria		**Bulgaria**		**Bulgaria**	
2002	1689	**2002**	206	**2002**	67
2005	1688	**2005**	205	**2005**	177
2008	1688	**2008**	250	**2008**	424
2012	461	**2012**	132	**2012**	24
Denmark		**Denmark**		**Denmark**	
2002	248	**2002**	185	**2002**	36
2005	231	**2005**	185	**2005**	0
2008	231	**2008**	133	**2008**	36
2012	116	**2012**	24	**2012**	0
Estonia		**Estonia**		**Estonia**	
2002	0	**2002**	0	**2002**	0
2005	0	**2005**	0	**2005**	0
2008	0	**2008**	24	**2008**	0
2012	0	**2012**	24	**2012**	0

Poland		**Poland**		**Poland**	
2002	2425	**2002**	254	**2002**	1201
2005	2228	**2005**	254	**2005**	1225
2008	2348	**2008**	111	**2008**	769
2012	2614	**2012**	0	**2012**	64
Hungary		**Hungary**		**Hungary**	
2002	1423	**2002**	301	**2002**	186
2005	416	**2005**	308	**2005**	206
2008	416	**2008**	308	**2008**	20
2012	30	**2012**	0	**2012**	16
Latvia		**Latvia**		**Latvia**	
2002	3	**2002**	0	**2002**	18
2005	3	**2005**	0	**2005**	22
2008	3	**2008**	0	**2008**	22
2012	3	**2012**	0	**2012**	0
Lithuania		**Lithuania**		**Lithuania**	
2002	0	**2002**	0	**2002**	18
2005	0	**2005**	0	**2005**	18
2008	0	**2008**	0	**2008**	0
2012	0	**2012**	0	**2012**	0
Romania		**Romania**		**Romania**	
2002	1976	**2002**	500	**2002**	216
2005	1435	**2005**	498	**2005**	334
2008	461	**2008**	0	**2008**	32
2012	444	**2012**	0	**2012**	36
Slovakia		**Slovakia**		**Slovakia**	
2002	686	**2002**	136	**2002**	48

2005	675	**2005**	150	**2005**	48
2008	632	**2008**	41	**2008**	48
2012	322	**2012**	42	**2012**	48
Germany		**Germany**		**Germany**	
2002	4600	**2002**	989	**2002**	493
2005	4520	**2005**	1010	**2005**	497
2008	4120	**2008**	963	**2008**	283
2012	873	**2012**	191	**2012**	76
Spain*		**Spain**		**Spain**	
2002	750	**2002**	180	**2002**	**183**
2005	467	**2005**	200	**2005**	**67**
2008	472	**2008**	200	**2008**	**146**
2012	580	**2012**	305	**2012**	**68**

* Data depicting expeditionary capabilities for all states per year. Spain is again presented in the color red.

Norway	**APC**	**Norway**	**Transport planes and tankers**	**Norway**	**Military helicopters**
2002	189	**2002**	6	**2002**	6
2005	189	**2005**	6	**2005**	0
2008	189	**2008**	6	**2008**	0
2012	390	**2012**	4	**2012**	0
Bulgaria		**Bulgaria**		**Bulgaria**	
2002	1671	**2002**	5	**2002**	39

2005	1643	**2005**	3	**2005**	44
2008	2409	**2008**	5	**2008**	23
2012	1084	**2012**	3	**2012**	23
Denmark		**Denmark**		**Denmark**	
2002	326	**2002**	3	**2002**	0
2005	310	**2005**	3	**2005**	0
2008	395	**2008**	4	**2008**	8
2012	566	**2012**	4	**2012**	8
Estonia		**Estonia**		**Estonia**	
2002	25	**2002**	0	**2002**	0
2005	29	**2005**	0	**2005**	0
2008	57	**2008**	0	**2008**	0
2012	88	**2012**	0	**2012**	0
Poland		**Poland**		**Poland**	
2002	33	**2002**	10	**2002**	72
2005	33	**2005**	13	**2005**	35
2008	693	**2008**	13	**2008**	37
2012	40	**2012**	3	**2012**	17
Hungary		**Hungary**		**Hungary**	
2002	798	**2002**	8	**2002**	50
2005	458	**2005**	5	**2005**	22
2008	458	**2008**	5	**2008**	17
2012	380	**2012**	5	**2012**	10
Latvia		**Latvia**		**Latvia**	
2002	13	**2002**	0	**2002**	2
2005	0	**2005**	0	**2005**	4
2008	0	**2008**	0	**2008**	4

2012	0	**2012**	0	**2012**	4
Lithuania		**Lithuania**		**Lithuania**	
2002	86	**2002**	3	**2002**	8
2005	137	**2005**	3	**2005**	10
2008	190	**2008**	4	**2008**	9
2012	187	**2012**	3	**2012**	9
Romania		**Romania**		**Romania**	
2002	1786	**2002**	15	**2002**	84
2005	1583	**2005**	10	**2005**	44
2008	1081	**2008**	9	**2008**	62
2012	1616	**2012**	8	**2012**	0
Slovakia		**Slovakia**		**Slovakia**	
2002	113	**2002**	2	**2002**	17
2005	120	**2005**	2	**2005**	20
2008	134	**2008**	0	**2008**	15
2012	99	**2012**	0	**2012**	1
Germany		**Germany**		**Germany**	
2002	3130	**2002**	90	**2002**	301
2005	3123	**2005**	96	**2005**	192
2008	2300	**2008**	90	**2008**	169
2012	1753	**2012**	86	**2012**	104
Spain		**Spain**		**Spain**	
2002	**2023**	**2002**	**104**	**2002**	**6**
2005	**2022**	**2005**	**93**	**2005**	**46**
2008	**2022**	**2008**	**99**	**2008**	**46**
2012	**1985**	**2012**	**52**	**2012**	**75**

Comments on the dataset:

***** IISS lists "look a like's" for various capabilities. These are however not included here.

** Some of the 0 values for the category air defence is not due to the fact that the states lacked these capabilities in a given year. Rather it is due to the fact that IISS lacked relevant data for the given years. This is especially true of lighter, hand held equipment, although it also appeared in relation to surface to air missiles and other larger materials.

Appendix 5

* Percentage of GDP spent on defence over the 10 year period. The data were taken from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2012, http://milexdata.sipri.org.

	Bulgaria	Denmark	Estonia	Germany	Hungary
2002	2,9	1,5	1,7	1,5	1,6
2003	2,8	1,5	1,7	1,4	1,7
2004	2,6	1,5	1,7	1,4	1,5
2005	2,4	1,3	1,9	1,4	1,4
2006	2,3	1,4	1,9	1,3	1,3
2007	2,5	1,3	2,1	1,3	1,3
2008	2	1,4	2,1	1,3	1,2
2009	2	1,4	2,3	1,4	1,1
2010	1,9	1,3	1,7	1,4	1
2011	1,5	1,4	1,7	1,3	1
2012	1,5	1,4	1,9	1,4	0,8
Mean:	**2,21**	**1,4**	**1,88**	**1,37**	**1,38**

Lithuania	Latvia	Norway	Poland	Romania	Slovakia	Spain*
1,7	1,6	2,1	1,9	2,3	1,8	1,2
1,7	1,7	2	1,9	2,1	1,9	1,1
1,5	1,7	1,9	1,9	2	1,7	1,1
1,4	1,7	1,6	1,9	2	1,7	1
1,4	1,9	1,5	1,9	1,8	1,6	1,2
1,4	1,7	1,5	2	1,5	1,5	1,2
1,4	1,7	1,4	1,7	1,5	1,5	1,2
1,4	1,4	1,7	1,8	1,4	1,5	1,2
1,1	1,1	1,5	1,9	1,3	1,3	1
1	1	1,5	1,8	1,3	1,1	0,9
1	0,9	1,4	1,9	1,2	1,1	0,8
Mean 1,36	**1,49**	**1,64**	**1,87**	**1,67**	**1,51**	1,08

Appendix 6

*** Abbrevations:**

APC: Armoured Personnel Carrier

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

USSR: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.